LexTRILOK CHAND JAIN versus STATE OF DELHI
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348 TRILOK CHAND JAlN v. STATE OF DELHI August 19, 1975 [Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BHAGWATI AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.] Prevention of Corruption Act (2 of 1947) ss. 4(1) and 5(1), (2), and Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860) s. 161--Scope of pres111nption under s 4(1). . A An inspector of the· Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking demanded a bribe for giving the complainant a power connection for his factory. Information hav~ncr been given to the anti-corruption police a trap was set. The inspector did not turn up at the appointed time to receive the money, but the appellant, a perma- nent labourer working under him, came to the complainant's factory, told him that he had been sent by the Inspector, and that the money should be given to him. The co1np!ainaqt, at first, insisted that the inspector himself should come, but later gave htm the money. The money was recovered from the appellant and the inspector and the appellant were charged with offences under the l're~ vention of Corruption Act. The trial court acquitted the inspector but conv'.cted the appellant under s. 5 (2) read with s. 5 (I) (d) of the Act, and under s. 161 I.P.C., with the aid of the presumption under s. 4(1) of the Act. The convictio~ was confirmed by the High Court. D Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD : ( 1) The question whether a government servant receiving money had the requisite incriminatory motivei is one of fact. [353H, 354A] (2) One of the essential ingredients of the offence under s. 161,' I.P.C., .is that the gratification must have been received by the accused as a motive or reward for committing an act or omission in connection with his official funct~ons. E Even if the government servant was incapable of showing any favour or .render- ing any service in connection Vlith h!s official duties, he may be guilfy; but, the existence of an understanding that the bribe was given in consideration of some official act or conduct is an important factor bearing on the question as to whether the accused had rece'..ved the ~ratification as a motive or reward as mentioned in s. !61, i.P.C. [353GH] ( 3) The appellant being a mere labourer was incapable of showing any favour or rendering any service to the complainant in connection with his official F duties. It had not been shown by the prosecution that he was in any way officially concerned w~,th the· installation Of poles or the giving· of electric con· nection; nor was it shown that the appellant made any representation, claim or promise, that he would either himself or through his inspector get an official act done for the complainant, or that the appellant had demanded br_ibe fron1 the complainant. [353A-C, Fl In the absence of any such circumstances the conduct of the appellant was not incompatible w~.th the role of an innocent carrier of money without the re· G quisfte ntens rea. [353_E1 (4) The charge· under S. 5(1)(d) also is unsustainable because, it could not be reasonably said that the appellant obtained the -money by using corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abusing his official position, as a pnblic servant. JI. [354-EF] .. (5) Section 4(1) o~ the Prevention of Corruption Act provides that in the trial of an offence punishable under s. 161 or 165_, I.P.C., or un_der els. (a) or II (b) of s. 5(1) read with sub-s. 5(2) of the .Act,_ 1! the prosecution proves tltat the accused had accepted or obtained a gr~ttfic~tton other than legal rel!lunera· tion the court has to presume that1 the gra~tficatl?n was accepted or obtained bv the accused as a motive or reward as mentioned 1n s. 161. I.P.C. tl51-H. 352Bl .f. ···~ ~ - ' ...... .. • A B c D E .F G· T. c. JAIN v. DELHI STATE (Sarkaria, !.) 349 (6) (a) 'fhe presumption, however, is not absolute and .is rebuttable. The qu.antum ~rnd nature of proof required to displace the presumption, varies accord- ing to the circumstances of each case. Such proof may partake of the shape of defence evidence adduced by the accused or, it may consist of circumstances appenring in the prosecution evidence itself as a result of cross·examination or oth~r\vi~e. While the mere explanation given by the accused in his examination under s. 342, Cr. P.C., may not be enough the burden on him to negate the presumption may stand discharged,· if the effect of the material brought on re~ord, in its totality, renders the existence of the fact to be presumed improbable. The acc
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