TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, ATHANI versus PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, HUBLI & ORS.

Citation: [1970] 1 S.C.R. 51 · Decided: 20-03-1969 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.M. SHELAT · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 10 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, ATHANI 
- v. 
PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, HUBLI & ORS. 
March 20, 1969 
(J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.] 
Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 33C(2)-Applications for pay. 
ment for overtime work and work done on off days-If governed by section 
-Wo dispute re : rates-Whether applications governed by s. 20(1) -of 
the Minimum Wages Act (11 of 1948), 
Limitation Act (36 of 1963), Art, 137-lf applies to applications to 
quasi-Judicial bodies. 
Applications, in which the claim of the workmen of the appellant for 
computation of !heir benefit in respect of over-time work and work done 
on weekly off-days, were entertained by the Labour Court, under s. 33C(2) 
of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. The Labour Court computed the 
amounts due to the various workmen and directed the appellant to make 
the payments. 
Writ petitions filed by the appellant in the High O>urt 
challenging .the decision of the Labour Court were dismissed. In appeal 
to this Court, it was con.tended that : (I) The jurisdiction of the Labour 
Court to proceed with the applications was 'barred by the provisions of the 
Minimum Wages Act, 1948; and (2) Even· if the applications were com-
petent 'and not barred by the Minimum Wages Act, they were time-barred 
under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 
· 
HELD : (I) The Minimum Wages Act is concerned with the llxin& of 
rates-rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rates for payment of work 
on a day of rest-and is not intended for enforcement of payment of 
wages. 
Under s. 20(1) of·the Minimum Wages Act, in which provision 
is made for seeking remedy in respect of .claims arising out of payment of 
less than minimum rates, or in respect of remuneration for ·days of reat1 
or for work on such days, or of wages at the overtime rates1 the Authority · 
is to~xercise jurisdiction for deciding claims which relate .to rates of·w&p, 
rate~ for payment of work done on days of rest and ·overtime rates. 
The 
power under s. 20(3) of the Minimum Wage& Act given to the Authority 
dealing with an application under s. 20( I) to direct payment of the actual 
amount fOund due, is only an incidental power for working out effectively 
the. directions under s. 20(1) fixing various rates under the Act. That is, 
if there is no dispute as to- rates between the employer and the employee 
and the only question i• whether a particular payment at the aareed rate 
i1 due or not, then s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act would not be 
attracted at all, and the appropriate remedy would only be either under 
•. IS(ll ol the Payment of Wa~es Act, 1936, or under s. 33C(2) of the 
Industr al Disputes Act. [59 D-G; 60 B-:Cl 
· 
In the pre1e11t case, there was no dispute by the appellant about the 
rates put fOrward. by the workmen; and a pleading by tho appellant in one 
of the aoplications that the State Government had not pretcribed any rates 
under the Minimum Wages Act, did not mean that there was a disput• as 
10 th.t rates claimed by the workmen. Therefore, the reD)edy under s. 20(1) 
of the 'Minimum Wages Act Could not have been sought by. the workmen, 
and hence, the question of the jurisdiction of the Lab!>ur Cou~ to entertain ' 
the applications under s. 33C(2) · of the Industrial Disputes Act beln1 
barred because of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Ac~ Cl)uld not • 
arise.[61 A.DJ 
• 
52 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1970] I s cR. 
(2) (a) Though the question of limitation under Art. 137 of the 196:;-
Act was not raised either 1n the Labour Olun or the High Court, it could 
be allowed to be raised in this Court, because, a quesuon 01 
limitation 
raises a plea o[ want of jurisdiction and is a pure question of Jaw, when 
it could he decided on the basis of the fac1s on the record, and the res-
pondents had sufficient notice of the question. [55 G-H] 
(b) Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs only application.o; 
!>Ie.et!ted to courts under the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes. 
The 
use of the word 'other' in the first column of the article aiving the descrip-
tion of the application as 'any other application for which no period of 
limitation is provided elsewhere in this division', indicatce I.hat the Lcaish1· 
ture wanted to make it clear that the interpretation put by this Court in 
Mu/chand 4 Co. v. Jawahor Mills, [1953] S.C.R. 351 and Bombay Gas Co. 
v. GopaJ Bhlva, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 709, 722-723 on Art. 181 at. the 1908-Act 
on the buil of ejiadem 1•ntrls should 

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