TOFAN SINGH versus STATE OF TAMIL NADU

Citation: [2013] 9 S.C.R. 962 · Decided: 08-10-2013 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.K. PATNAIK · Disposal: Matter referred to larger bench

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
[2013] 9 S.C.R. 962 
TOFAN SINGH 
v. 
STATE OF TAMIL NADU 
(Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 2013) 
OCTOBER 08, 2013 
[A.K. PATNAIK AND A.K. SIKRI, JJ.] 
NARCOTIC 
DRUGS 
AND 
PSYCHOTROPIC 
SUBSTANCES ACT, 1985: 
s. 67 - Power to call for information etc. - Questions: (i) 
whether the officer investigating the matter under NDPS Act 
would qualify as police officer or not and (ii) whether the 
statement recorded by the investigating officer u/s. 67 of the 
D Act can be treated as confessional statement or not, even if 
the officer is not treated as police officer - Referred to large 
Bench - Further, sentence suspended till the disposal of 
appeal by the larger Bench - Appellant released on bail. 
The appellant, along with others, was convicted uls. 
E 8(c) r/w s. 21 (c) and s. 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and was sentenced 
to R1 for 10 years with fine of Rs. 1 lakh under each of 
the two counts. His appeal was dismissed by the High 
Court. 
F 
In the instant appeal, it was primarily contended for 
the appellant that appellant's conviction was vitiated as 
it was based solely on the purported confessional 
statement recorded u/s. 67 of the NDPS Act, which did 
G not have any evidentiary value. It was submitted that there 
was no power in s. 67 of the NDPS Act to either record 
confessions or substantive evidence which can form 
basis for conviction of the accused; and that in any case, 
such a statement was not admissible in evidence as the 
H 
962 
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 
963 
excise official recording the statement was to be treated 
as "police officer" and thus, the evidential value of the 
statement recorded before him was hit by the provisions 
of s. 25 of the Evidence Act. On the other. hand, on behalf 
A 
of the State, it was pointed out that in the case of 
Kanhaiyalal', it was categorically held that the officer u/ 
B 
s. 63 was not a police officer. 
Referring the matter to larger Bench, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 Abdul Rashid and Noor Aga were the 
cases under the Customs Act. But the reasons for C 
holding custom officer as police officer would have 
significant bearing even when the issue is cosidered in 
the context of NDPS Act as well. It would be more so 
when the schemes and purport of the two enactments are 
kept in mind. NDPS Act is purely penal in nature. In 
contradistinction, as far as the Customs Act and the 
Central Excise Act are concerned, their dominant object 
is to protect revenue of the State and penal provisions 
to punish the person found offending those laws are 
secondary in nature. [Para 32] [992-C-D] 
Abdul Rashid v. State of Bihar (2001) 9 SCC 578; Raja 
Ram Jaiswa/ v. (1964) 2 SCR 752; Noor Aga v. State of 
Punjab 2008 (10) SCR 379 = (2008) 9 SCALE 681 - referred 
D 
E 
~. 
F 
1.2 NDPS Act is a complete code relating to Narcotic 
Substances, and dealing with the offences and the 
procedure to be followed for the detection of the offences 
as well as for the prosecution and the punishment of the 
accused. The provisions are penal provisions which can, 
G 
in certain cases, deprive a person of his liberty for a 
minimum period. of 10 years and can also result in 
sentences which can extend upto 20 years or even death 
1. 
Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India 2008 (1) SCR 350. 
H 
964 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2013) 9 S.C.R. 
A sentence under certain circumstances. The provisions, 
therefore, have to be strictly construed and the 
safeguards provided therein have to be scrupulously and 
honestly followed. [Para 33) [992-E-G] 
B 
Baldev Singh (1997) 1 SCC 416; Union of India v. Bal 
Mukund 2009 (5) SCR 205 = (2009) 12 SCC 161; Balbir 
Singh v. State ofHaryana 1987 (1) SCR 1095=(1987)1 SCC 
533 - relied on. 
1.3 The cruciartest.to determine is whether an officer 
C is a police officer for the purpose of s. 25 of the Evidence 
Act viz. the "influence or authority" that an officer is 
capable of exercising over a person from whom a 
confession is obtained. The term "police officer" has not 
been defined under the Code or in the Evidence Act and, 
D therefore, the meaning ought to be assessed not by 
equating the powers of the officer sought to be equated 
with a police officer but from the power he possesses 
from the perception of the common public to assess his 
capacity to influence, pressure or coercion on persons 
E who are searched, detained or arrested. The influence 
exercised has to be, assessed from the consequences 
that a person is likely 

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