THIRU K. PALANISWAMY versus M. SHANMUGAM & ORS.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A B C D E F G H 1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 1392 of 2023) FEBRUARY 23, 2023 [DINESH MAHESHWARI AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.] Injunction β Prayer for temporary injunction β Political Party β Party Constitution β Dispute inter-se in the political party β The topmost position in the party was earlier assigned to the General Secretary but, after the demise of the then General Secretary on 05.12.2016, the party organisation went through various changes and ultimately, a system of joint leadership, by Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator β However, when the proposition for amendments of the byelaws, essentially to revert to the system of single leadership at the apex level, was likely to come up in the meeting of the General Council dated 23.06.2022, it led to the litigation β In the said meeting (23.06.2022) resolution to propose one βTMHβ as a chairman was proposed β It is alleged that the said βTMHβ announced next date of General Council meeting as 11.07.2022 β Various civil suits were filed β The Single Judge of the High Court took note of the various interim applications and proceeded to decide the same by order dated 17.08.2022 β It held, inter-alia, that the General Council meeting dated 11.07.2022 was not convened by the person competent to convene the General Council meeting β The said meeting was not convened providing 15 days advance notice β The status quo ante as existing on 23.06.2022 was held to be maintained and it was directed that there would be no Executive Council meeting or General Council meeting without the joint consent of the Co- ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator β However, the said order was set aside by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order dated 17.08.2022 β On appeal, held: The Division Bench referred to the principles governing the grant or refusal of temporary injunction and pointed out that the directions given by the Single Judge for convening the meeting only with the joint consent of Co- ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was leading to a situation where the party as a whole would undergo irreparable hardship because there was no possibility of the appellant and the respondent No. 1- [2023] 7 S.C.R. 1118 1118 A B C D E F G H 1119 OPS and EPS β acting jointly to convene the meeting β The Division Bench pointed out that the directions of the Single Judge would only further the βfunctional deadlockβ already existing in the party β The logic and reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Court stand accord with the law and also facts of the present case β So far as convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 is concerned, the same had never been in doubt or in any dispute β The said meeting was indeed convened by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co- ordinator jointly β They had been working in tandem until that stage β However, they seem to have fallen apart immediately thereafter, particularly when a proposition for amendment of the byelaws and reverting to the system of single leadership was in the offing β If majority of members gave a requisition on 23.06.2022 for convening the General Council meeting and the Presidium Chairman announced the date of this requisitioned meeting as 11.07.2022, in the given set of facts and circumstances, such announcement, at least at the present stage, cannot be dubbed as wholly redundant β Single Judge while passing the order dated 17.08.2022 had committed a serious error in convening of the meeting dated 11.07.2022 as an act unauthorised β Another alleged infirmity as to 15 daysβ notice, the Division Bench appears to have rightly analysed the frame of the said Rule 19(vii), where the requirement of 15 daysβ notice is referable to the regular meeting and not as such to a requisitioned or special meeting β Thus, the Single Judge did not examine the questions in the correct perspective. Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The Division Bench also referred to the principles governing the grant or refusal of temporary injunction and pointed out that the directions given by the learned Single Judge for convening the meeting only with the joint consent of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was leading to a situation where the party as a whole would undergo irreparable hardship because there was no possibility of the appellant and the respondent No.1 β OPS and EPS β acting jointly to convene the meeting. The Division Bench pointed out that the directions of the learned Sing
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex