THE VISHNU PRATAP SUGAR WORKS (P) LTD. versus THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF STAMPS, U.P.
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THE VISHNU PRATAP SUGAR WORKS (P) LTD. v. THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF STAMPS, U.P. May 4, 1967 (R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHBLAT AND V. BH>,RGAVA, JJ,) Court Fees Act, 1870 (8 of 1870), S. 7 (Iv-A), (a) and S. 7 (iv-B) (b)-Acts impositing tax-Suit for injunction on the ground that Acts void-Court Jee pt>yab/e. The appellant-company filed a suit against the State ·of U.P. and Union of India for a permanent injunction restraining the State from pro- ceeding to realise cess and tax under the U .P. Sugar Cane Cess Act 1956 read with U.P. Sugar Cane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961 and the Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the Acts were invalid and void. On its plaint, the appellant paid court-fees under sub- s, (iv-B) (b) of s. 7 on the footing that the relief sought was an injunc- tion. The respondent the Chief Inspector of Stamps objected, contmd- ing that court-fees payable were under sub-11. (iv-A) of s. 7 on the ground that the suit was for a declaratory decree, where consequential relief prayed for was an injunction or Of adjudging void an instrument securing money or other property havina such value. The trial Court rejected the respondent's objection, which the High Court revened. In appeal, this Court, HELD : The court-fees payable on the plaint were under cl. (b) of sub-s. (iv-B) of s. 7 and neither cl. (a) of sub-5, (iv-A) of s. 7 nor sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 applied. The plaint when read as a whole showed that though the appellant alleged that the Acts were void and therefore non-est for the reasons set out therein, it did not seek any declaration that they were void. The plaint proceeded on the footing that the said Acts were void and that therefore the State of U .P. or its authorities had no power to realise the tax and the cess. It may be that while deciding whether to grant the injunction or not, the court might have to consider the question as to the validity or otherwise of the said Acts. But that must happen in almost every case where an injunction is prayed for. If for the mere reason that the court might have to go into such a question, a pr8fer for injunction were to be treated as one for a declaratory decree of which the consequential relief is injunction all suits where in1unction is prayed for would have to be treated as falling under cl. (a) of sub-s. (iv) of s. 7 and in that v~w cl. (b) of sub-I. (iv) of s, 7 would be superfluous. [924E-H! B c D E F Ramanbhal Ashabhal Patel v. Dabhl A/ltkumar Fulsln;I, [1965] 1 G S.C.R. 712 : referred to. Ordinarily a statute is not an instrument unless as in the case of Conveyancing Act, 1881, the definition includes it or as in the case of s. 205 (I) (viii) of the Law of Property Act, 1925, tho statute crootes a settlement and such statute is for that reason trea.OOd as an instrument, ~o. the Acts alleged in the plaint to be void are not instruments within t '..he meaning of sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7. [923 G-H] H Mohan Chowdhury v. ·The Chief Commissioner [1964] 3 S.C.R. 442, and Emperor v. Ravango11da Lingangouda Patil; A.I.R. 1944 Born. 259. referred to. VISHNU PRATAP LTD. v. CHIEF INSPECTOR (She/at, J.) 92 I A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1668 of B c 1966. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 2, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 1095 of 1965. G. N. Dixit, for the appellant. Bishan Narain and 0. P. Rana, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J, The appellant-company filed suit No. 16 of 1963 against the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Union of India, inter alia, praying for a permanent injunction restaining the State of Uttar Pradesh, its servants and agents from realising or from pro- ceeding· to realise sugarcane cess and purchase tax amounting to Rs. 33 lakhs and odd charged under the U.P. Sugar Cane (Regu- lation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, the Sugar Cane Cess Act, 1956 read with the U.P. Sugar Cane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961 and the U.P. Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act, IX of 1961. o In the said suit, the appellant-company, inter-a/ia, alleged that the Acts for the diverse reasons set out therein were invalid and void and therefore the State was not entitled to levy, collect or recover the said cess or the purchase tax and prayed, as aforesaid. that the State should be restrained from proceeding to realise the said cess or tax. The appellant-company paid c
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