LexTHE TULSIPUR SUGAR CO. LTD. versus TIIE NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE, TULSIPUR
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1111 THE TULSIPUR SUGAR CO. LTD. v. TIIE NOTIFJED AREA COMMITTEE, TULSIPUR Febmary 27, 1980 (D. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.] Ad1ninistrative law-Conditional legislmion-Subordinate /egislatio1i-Power to extend the area of Municipal Co111111ittee whether' subordinate legislation- Audi alteram partefn-When necessary. The plaintiff (appellant) was a sugar n1anufa<:tur~r with its factory in a suburb of Tulsipur Town. By a notification issued on August 22, 1955 under section 3 of the U.P. Town Area Act, 1914 the limits of the Tulsipur Town \\'ere extended bringing the factory area within the jurisdiction of the Town Area Committee. In October, 1959 a draft notification was issued by which objections and representa-tions to the levy of octroi on goods brought into the limits of the Town Arca Comn1ittee 1 for: the purposes of sale, use or consumption were invited. Later a final -notification dated Decetnber 15, l 959 v.1as issued under section 39, In both the notifications however though reference \Vas rnade to two schedules to the notifications in neit·her \Vas the second schedule which referred to the lin1its of the Town Area, added. This defect was cured by notification dated A.pril 14, 1960 inc9rpor.ating Schedule II in the Notification dated December 15, 1959. The plaintiff was then cailed upon to pay octroi on some of the inatcrials and stores brought into the factory. The plaintiff thereupon questioned the vslidity of the Notification dated August 22, 1955 extending the limits of the Town Area Com1uittee bringing its factory within the limits of the Town Area Committee and the subsequent notifications on the grounds that (i) the first of them dated August 22, 1955 did not give an opportunity to all concerned to n1ake representa1ions regarding the advisability of extending the limits of the Town Area Committee (ii) that the notification dated December 15, 1959 \\'as inchoate because neither the draiit notification nor the final notificMion contained the second .schedule and (iii) that this defect could not oe cured by issue of the Notification dated April 14, 1960 in that it was issued without follo\ving the· procedure prescribed by section 39 of the Act. The Trial Court held that the notification of August 22, 1955 was not open to question, that there was no valid levy because the draft notification the final notification and the amending notifica.tion were invalid and ineffective for the reason that the omission of the second Schedule \\'as a 1uaterial illegality and the subsequent notification could not validate an irregular notification. On appeal by the defendoo.t the civil judge, and on furlhel' appeal the High Court, disn1issed the plaintiff's suit. In appeal to this court it \.vas contended that since the declaration of any erea as a town area involved civil consequences, exercise of power by the State A B c D E F G H A B c D E F 1112 SUPREME COURT REPOHS [1980] 2 S.C.R. Government under section 3 by necessary implication imposed a duty on the State Government to give publicity to its proposals and failure to comply with !uch procedure invalidated a declaration made under section 3. DismiMing the appeal, HELD: 1. Where a function performed by the, State Governn1ent is judicial or quasi-judicial involving adjudication of the rights of any person resulting in ch·il consequences it becomes necessary to follow the maxim audi alteram partem (hear the other side) before taking a decision. [1118E] 2. In order to establish that a duty to act judicially applies to the perform- ance of a pa!rl:icular function it is no longer ne~essa ry to show that the function is analytically of a judicial character or involves the determination of a lis inter partes, though the presumption that natural justice must be observed will arise more readily \Vhere there is an express duty to decide· only after conducting a hearing or inquiry or \Vhere the decision is. one entailing the determination of disputed questions of la\v and fact. Prima-facie a duty io act judicially will arise in the exercise of a power to deprive a person of his livelihood or of his legal status where the statuS is not merely terminable at pleasure or to deprive a person of liberty or property rights or other legitimate interest or expect'ation or to impose a penalty on him; though the conferment of a wide discretionary power exercisable in the public interest may be indic
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