LexTHE SUPERINTENDENT, CENTR.AL PRISON, FATEHGARH versus RAM MANOHAR LOHIA
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-. - - S.C.R.. SUPR.EME COUR.T R.EPORTS 821 THE SUPER.INTENDENT, CENTR.AL PR.ISON, FATEHGARE v. RAM MANOHAR. LORIA (B. P. SINHA, C.J., P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo, K.C. DAs GUPTA AND J.C. SHAH, JJ.) Fundamental Right-Infringement of-Enactment imposing restrictions on freedom of speech-Constitu.tional validity-Test- "In the interest of public order". Meaning of-Doctrine of severabi- lity-Applicability-Constitution of India, Arts. r9(r) (a), r9(2)- U.P. Special Powers Act, r932 (U.P. XIV of r932) s. 3. Section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932 (XIV of 1932), provided as follows:- "Whoever, by word, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations, or otherwise, instigates, expressly or by implication, any person or class of persons not to pay or to defer payment of any liability, and whoevet does any act, with intent or knowing it to be likely that any words, signs or visible representations containing such instigation shall thereby be communicated directly or indirectly to any person or class of persons, in any manner whatsoever, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine, extending to Rs. 250, or with both." The appellant, who was prosecuted under the section for deliver- ing speeches instigating cultivators not to pay enhanced irrigation rates to the Government, applied to the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground, amongst others, that the said section was inconsistent with Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and as such void. The High Court decided in favour of the appellant and he was released. The State appealed to this Court and the question for determination was whether the impugned section embodied reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order and was thus protected by Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. Held, that even though in a comprehensive sense all the grounds specified in Art. 19(2) of the Constitut.ion on which any reasonable restrictions on the right fo freedom of speech must be based can be brought under the general head "public order", that expression, inserted into the Article by the Constitution (First Amendment) 'Act, 1951, must be demarcated from the other grounds and ordinarily read in an exclusive sense to mean public peace, safety and tranquility in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife and war, affecting the security of the State. Ramesh Thappar v. The State of Madras (1950) S.C.R. 594, Brij Bhushan v. fThe State of Delhi. (1950) S.C.R. 605, The State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi. (1952) S.C.R. 654 and Cantewell v. Connecticut. (1940) 310 U.S. 296, discussed. I960 January 2c. 822 SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS (1960(2)] i960 It is \vcll settled by decisions of this Court that in a restric- tion in order to be reasonable must have a reasonable relation to The Superintendent, the object the Legislation has in view and must not go beyond it . . Central Prison, Restrictions, therefore, meant to be in the interest of public Fatehgarh order 'vhich have no proximate relationship or nexus with it v. but can be only remotely or hypothetically connected with it, Ra1n .lfanohar cannot be reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19(2) of the Lohia Constitution. Rex v. Basudcva, A.I.R. (r950) F.C. 67, applied. Ramji Lal Modi v. The State of U.P. (r957) S.C.R. 860 and Virendra v. The State of Pttnjab, (r958) S.C.R. 308, explained. So judged, it cannot be said that the acts prohibited under the wide and sweeping provisions of s. 3 of the Act can have any proximate or even foreseeable connection with public order.sought to be protected by it, and, consequently, that section, being violative of the right to freedom of speech guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution, must be struck down as ' unconstitutional. It would be incorrect to argue that since instigation by a single individual not to pay taxes might ultimately lead to a revolution resulting in distruction of public order, that instiga- tion must have a proximate connection with public order. No fundamental rights can be restricted on such hypothetical and imaginary consideration. Nor is it possible to accept the argument that in a demo- cratic set up there can be no scope for agitational approach or that any instigation to break a bad law must by itself constitute a breach of public order, for to do so without obvious limitations would be to destro
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