LexTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL versus ANWAR ALI SARKAR
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'1952 /<1n. 11 284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1952) THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANWAR ALI SARKAR HABIB MOHAMED, I THE STATE OF HYDERABAD, and J· THE STATE OF MYSORE THE ST A TE OF WEST BENGAL fl. GAJAN MALI lntervcners. [PATANJALI SAs'i'RI C.J., FAZL Au, MEim CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs, CHANDRASEKHARA A1Y AR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.] West Bengal Spetial Courts Act (X of 1950), ss. 3, 5-Constitu- lion of India, Art. 14-Act constituting special courts and empower~ ing State Government to refer "cases" or noffences,, or "classes of cases" or "classes of offencel' to such Court-Constitutional validity -Fundamental right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws-Construction of Act-Reference to preamble-Act not classifying cases or laying down standard for classification-lnten· tion of legislature hotu far material-Validity of notification under Act-Test of equality before law-Essentials of reasonable classifica. tion-N ecessity of speedier trial, whether reasonablt: ground for discrimination. The West Bengal Special Courts Act (X of 1950) was entitled uAn Act to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences~" and the object of the Act, as declared in the preamble, was "to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences". Section 3 of the Act empowered the State Government by notification in the official gazette to constitute Special Courts, and sec. 5 pro-. vided that "A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may by general or special order in writing, direct.n The Act laid down a procedure for trial before Special Courts which was different in several respects from that laid down by the Criminal Procedure Code for trial of offences generally. The respondent, who was convicted by a Special Court which tried his case under a notification issued by the Government under sec. 5, contended ·that the said section was unconstitutional and void inasmuch as it contravened Art. 14 of the Constitutiorl, which provides that "the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws Within the tertitory of India": . .. ·-"" --- . -i-. ,. . - , . S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 285 Held, per FAZL Au, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, ·CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and BosE JJ. (PATANJALI SAsTRI C. ]., dissenting)-Sec- tion 5 ( 1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Acti, 1950, contra- venes Art. 14 of the Constitution and is void inasmuch as (per FAZL Au, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.) the procedure laid down by the Act for the trial by the Special Courts varied substantially from that laid down for the trial of offences generally by the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Act did not classify, or lay down any basis for classification, of the cases vthich may be directed to be tried by the Special Court, but left it to the uncontrolled discretion of the State Government to direct any case which it liked to be tried by the Special Court. DAs ].-Section 5 ( 1 )of the Act, in so far as it empowered the State Government to direct "offences" or "classes of offences" or "classes of cases" to be tried by a Special Court, does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government but by necessary implication contemplates. a proper classification and is not void. That part of the section which empowered the Government to direct "cases" as distinct from "classes of cases" to be tried by a Special Court is void. PATANJALI SAsTRI C. ].-Section 5 (I) ot the Act is not void or unconstitutional wholly or even in part. Per FAZL Au, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHAR.\ ArYAR JJ.-A rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of Art. 14 of the Constitution as any rule of substantive law and it is necessary that all litigants, who arc similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief and for defence with like protection and without discrimination. (ii) If it is established that the person complaining has been discriminated against as a result of legislation and denied equal privileges with others occupying the same position, it is not inc um bent upon him before he can claim relief on the basis of fundamental rights to assert and prove that, in making the Jaw, the legislature was actuated by a hostile or in
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