THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH versus KAUSHALIYA AND OTHERS

Citation: [1964] 4 S.C.R. 1002 · Decided: 01-10-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

1963 
Oclober l 
1002 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1964] 
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
v. 
KAUSHALIYA AND OTHERS 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K. N. WANCHOO, 
J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.) 
Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 
1956 (104 of 1956), s. 20-"0n receiving information", meaning 
of-Whether information could be from any source. 
Constitution of India, Art. 14-Whether Suppression of Im-
moral Traffic in Women Act, 1956, s. 20 gives Magistrate uncana-
lised power-Article 19-Whether s. 20 a reasonable restriction. 
The respondents in the above 6 appeals are alleged to be pr<>-
stitutes carrying on their trade in Kanpur. On receiving 
infor-
mation from the Sub-Inspector of Police who is not a Special 
Police Officer, the City Magistrate issued notices to the respondents: 
under s. 20(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women 
and Girls Act, 1956 to show cayse why they should not be required 
to remove themselves from the 
place where they were resi-
ding. 
The respondents filed their objections claiming that the 
proceedings 
were 
not 
legally 
maint<iinable. 
The 
Magistrate 
repelled the objections. Their revision petitions were dismissed by 
the Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court allowed their re-
vision on the ground that s. 20 of the Act offended Arts. 14 and 
19(1)(d)(e) of the Constitution of India. 
The Stale appealed to 
this Court on certificates granted by the High Court. 
Before this Court it was contended that the information re-
ceived by the Magistrate must be information received from a special 
police officer designated under s. 13 of the 
Act. 
The next con-
tention was that in as much under s. 20 the Magistrate acted in 
his executive capacity, his powers were uncanalized, he is conferred 
with power capable of discriminating between prostitute and pros-
titute and he could interfere on flimsy grounds in the lives of respec-
table woman and that the section offended against Art. 14. It was 
further contended that s. 20 imposed an unreasonable restriction on 
girls and women leading a life of prostitution and hence it violated 
Art. 19(\)(d) and (e). 
Held: (i) If the Legislature intended to confine the expression 
"information" only to that given by a special police officer, it 
would have specifically stated so in the section. The omission is a 
clear indication that a particular source of information is not 
material for the application of the section. 
Giving the rational 
meaning to the expression 
"on receiving information" it is clear 
that information may be from any source. 
(ii) The Act discloses a clear policy affording a real guidance 
for the 1fagistrate to decide the two questions which he is called 
upon to adjudicate under s. 20 of the Act. 
He functions as 
a court and decides the said t\vo questions after giving full opportu-
) -
r 
I-
-! 
'I S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
1003 
nity to the alleged prostitute to respresent her case and examine 
her evidence. His decision is subject to revision by the 
Sessions 
Court or the High Court as the case may be. In the circumstances 
it is not possible to say that uncanalized power is conferred on the 
Magistrate as an executive authority to decide the fate of an 
alleged prostitute in an arbitrary manner. 
(iii) It is well settled that Art. 14 does not prohibit reasonable 
classifications for the purpose of legislation and a law will not 
infringe Art. 
14 if the classification is founded on an intelligible 
differentia and the said differentia has rational relation to the object 
to be achieved by the said law. There are pronounced and real 
difference Between a woman who is a prostitute and one who 
is not and bet\.veen a prostitute who does not demand in public 
interest any restriction on her movements and a prostitute whose 
action in public places call for the imposition of restriction on her 
movement and even deportation. 
The difference between these 
classes of prostitutes has a rational relation to the object sought to 
be achieved by the Act. Section 20 in order to prevent moral de-
cadence in a busy locality, seeks to restrict the movements of the 
second category of prostitutes or to deport such of them as the 
peculiar methods of their operation in an area may demand. Sec-
tion 20 therefore does not offend Art. 14. 
Begum v. State, A.LR. 1963 Born. 17 and Shama Bai v. State 
of U. P. 
A.LR. 1959 All 57. 
{iv) The reasonableness of a restriction depends upon the 
value of lif

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