THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH versus GLJRBAKSH SINGH

Citation: [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 838 · Decided: 29-01-1962 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.K. DAS · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

IHI 
J_,u 
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SCPP. 
PHATAP SINGH A1"'D ANOTHER 
v. 
GlJRBAKSH SINGH 
(S. K. DAs, K. St:BBA RAo and RAGHt:BAR 
DAYAL, JJ.) 
Conl"11pt of Court-Circular letter prohibiting Governmtnl 
,.,..,nt from aeehng d.ciaion of Court 
bPfore exhausting official 
remediea-Proceeding on 
1uch circular letter pending suit-If 
co...tilulta conkn.pl of Court-Contempt of r,•ourl.8 .. fol, 1952 
(32 <f 1952), '· 3. 
The appellants, both public se1vants, initiated depart· 
mental 
proceeding. 
against 
the 
respondent, 
another 
public servant, for having sued 
the Government in the 
Subordinate Judge's Court •l Amritsar for a declaration that 
a certain sum of money was being illegally deducted from his 
salary; the respondent brought the suit before txhausting all 
hiJ deparUnental remedies as required bl an official circular 
which directed "that in 
the matter o grievanccs arising out 
of a Government Servant's employment conditions of service 
the proper course is to seek redress from the appropriate 
departmental and Government authorities. Any attempt by a 
Government servant to seek a drcision on such issues in a 
Court of law (even in cases where such a remedy is legally 
admissible) without first exhausting the normal official 
channels of redress can only be rcgardtd as contrary to ofl"icial 
propriety and subveraive of good discipline and may well 
justify the initiation of disciplinary action against the Govern· 
ment servant". The respondent complained to the High 
Court that the two appellants had committed rontempt of 
court punishable under s. 3 of the Contempt of Couru Act, 
1952, as th<ir action was tentamount to interfering with his 
legal rights to seek rcdrtss in a court of law and amounted to 
exerting 
ptcs1Utt upon him to withdraw the suit, thereby 
obstructing the judicial proccss and interfering with the course 
of a suit pending in a Court subordinatt to the High Court, 
The High Court held that that the appciiaPts were clearly 
guilty of contempt but since they were merely carrying out 
the instructions of the Government, the ends of justice would 
be suftkitntly met if they were directed to abandon the 
departmental proceedings and warned against romplying with 
the said instructions. It was contended on behalf of the 
appellants that the circular letter, fairly construed, did not 
impose any absolute ban but merely impoocd an obligation on 
a Government servant to exhaust his departmental remedies 
2 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
839 
before taking recourse to a 
court of law and as such did not 
constitute an interference with the course of justice. 
Jleld, (per S. K. 
Das and Subba Rao, JJ.), that any 
conduct which interferes with or prejudices parties litigant 
during the litigation 
amounts to contempt of Court. The 
question is not whether the action in fact interfered with but 
whether it had a tendency to interfere with the due course of 
justice. There was no doubt_ that the proceedings initiated 
in the prcJen: case by the appellants on the basis of the 
circular letter had only one tendency, namely, to coerce the 
respondent to 
withdraw 
the pending suit or not to press it. 
The appellants must be held guilty of contempt of court, 
and it would be no defence to 
say that 
they were merely 
carrying out executive directions 
contained 
in the circular 
letter. 
The question at issue was not whether the circular letter 
was valid in the abs tract, but whether the action taken 
against the respondent on the basis of the circular letter at a 
time when the 
suit was 
pending amounted to interference 
with the due course of justice. 
Shankar Lal Sharma v. M. S. Bisht, A. I. R. 1956 All. 
160, referred to. 
S.S. Roy v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1960 S. C. 190 and 
Webster v. Bakewell Rural District Council, L. R. 1916 1 Ch. 
~00, held inapplicable. 
Per Dayal, J .-1 here could be no 
doubt that pressure 
put on a party to a 
pending litigation to act in a particular 
way would amount to contempt of court, but the initiation of 
the proceedings by the appellants revealed no such conduct. 
The charge-sheet did not indicate that the departmental 
pro~edings were i~ tended to put pressure on the respondent 
to withdraw the smt. The appellant• who were doing their 
duty under the circular letter, the validity of which was not 
in question, could not be held to 
be guilty of contempt of 
Court. 
Oheriyan Joseph v. Dr. Jamea Kalacherry, A.I.R. 1952 
Trav. Co.· 75, approved. 
Sha

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