THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS. versus BAKHSHISH SINGH

Citation: [1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 91 · Decided: 05-05-1997 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

-~ 
t 
THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS. 
A 
v. 
BAKHSHISH SINGH 
MAY 5, 1997 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.) 
B 
Seivice Law : 
Dismissal-Constable of Polic~Mi~conduct-Unauthorised absence 
from duty for long period-Inquiry co,11ducted--Dismissed from seivic~Suit C 
by delinquent-Dismissed by trial court-First appellate Court remanded the 
matter 011 question of punishment-Held, it is for disciplinary authority to 
impose appropriate pwzishment-Civil Cow1 cannot substitute its own view 
in this respect-Order of trial Coun con/inned. 
' 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4212 of 0 
1997. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.8.96 of the Punjab and 
Haryana High Court in RS.A. No. 1555 of 1996. 
A.S. Sohal for R.S. Sodhi for the Appellants. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
Though all steps have been taken to ensure the service of notice, the 
respondent could not be contacted for service. Even the last known address 
was tapped to effect the service; but that has also proved abortive. Under 
these circumstances, notice must be deemed to have been served. 
Leave granted. 
E 
F 
The respondent, who was a Constable in the police service of the 
State of Punjab, absented himself from duty for a long period, i.e., from G 
November 7, 1986 to March 1, 1988, without any leave. As a result, 
disciplinary action was initiated against the respondent and enquiry was 
conducted. The disciplinary authority on the basis of finding of dereliction 
of non-reporting for duty, dismissed him from service. The ci trial Court 
dismissed the suit filed by the respondent. On appeal, the first appellate H 
91 
92 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP.1 S.C.R. 
A Court remanded the matter for reconsideration by the trial Court on the 
point of punishment. The High Court has dismissed the Second Appeal 
No. 155/96 summarily by its judgment and order dated August 21, 1996. 
Thus, this appeal by special leave. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
The appellate Court recorded the finding as under : 
"I have gone through the above authorities and am of the con-
sidered opinion that although the plaintiff was admittedly guilty of 
misconduct in absenting himself but misconduct could not be 
classified as the gravest act of misconduct within the meaning of 
the sub-rule. The contention appears to be well-founded. It is true 
that, generally speaking, it is for the punishing authority to deter-
mine the seriousness of punishment and it is not within the ambit 
of the powers of this Court to interfere with the direction of the 
authority. But then there is an important exception to this rule and 
that is that the Court will strike down an order which has been 
passed illegal only and arbitrarily. In the present case, it was 
incumbent on the defendants, before he could award the punish-
ment of dismissal, to come to a finding that the misconduct 
attributed to the respondent was a 'gravest act of misconduct'. It 
is true that in the context in which that expression is used it does 
not mean an act which is absolutely the worst act of misconduct 
and means, on the other hand, an act denoting a very high degree 
of misconduct as opposed to a merely grave or a very grave act of 
misconduct. But then it appears that the defendants when awarding 
the punishment were not alive to the provisions of the sub-rule 
otherwise he would not only not have awarded the punishment of 
dismissal without coming to a finding that the misconduct at-
tributed to the respondent was of the gravest type but would 
perhaps not have awarded that punishment at all for the reasons 
that the misconduct even though grave was not of the gravest type. 
The lack of finding about the misconduct being of the requisite 
type makes the impugned order arbitrary in nature and, therefore, 
liable to be quashed." 
It is settled legal position that it is for the disciplinary authority to 
pass appropriate punishment; the civil Court cannot substitute its own view 
H to that of the disciplinary as well as appellate authority on the nature of 
STAIE v. B. SINGH 
93 
the punishment to be imposed upon the delinquent officer. In view of the A 
finding of the appellate Court that it is a grave misconduct, the appellate 
Court ought not to have interfered with the decree of the trial Court. The 
High Court dismissed it without application of the mind and ignoring the 
settled legal principles. 
The appeal is accordingly allowed. The orders of the High Court and B 
the appellate Court stand

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