THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. versus MIS. ARK BUILDERS PVT. LTD.

Citation: [2011] 4 S.C.R. 432 · Decided: 28-02-2011 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: AFTAB ALAM · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
[2011) 4 S.C.R. 432 
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. 
v. 
MIS. ARK BUILDERS PVT. LTD. 
(Civil Appeal No. 2152 of 2011) 
FEBRUARY 28, 20fl 
[AFTAB ALAM AND R.M. LQDHA, JJ.) 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: s.34 - Period 
of limitation for making an application uls.34 for setting aside 
C an arbitral award - Held: Is to be reck~ned from the date a 
signed copy of the award is delivered tQ the objector by the 
arbitrator and not from the date a copy of the award is received 
by him by any means and from any source - Limitation. 
0 
Interpretation of statutes: If the l~w prescribes that a 
copy of the order/award is to be communicated, 'delivered, 
dispatched, forwarded, rendered or sent to the parties 
concerned in a patticular way and sets a period of limitation 
for challenging the order/award in question by the aggrieved 
E party, then the period of limitation can only commence from 
the date on which the order/award was received by the party 
concerned in the manner prescribed by 'fhe law - Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.34. 
The question which arose for consideration in the 
F instant appeal was whether the perlbd of limitation for 
making an application under section 34 of the Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside an arbitral 
award is to be reckoned from the date a copy of the 
award is received by the objector by any means and from 
G any source, or it would start running from the date a 
signed copy of the award is delivered to him by the 
arbitrator. 
H 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
432 
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STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. v. ARK 
433 
BUILDERS PVT. LTD. 
HELO: 1.1. Section 31 (1) of the Arbitration and 
A 
C<?nciliation Act,•1996 obliges the members of the arbitral 
tribunal/ arbitrator to mllke the award in writing and to sign 
it·and sub-section (5) then mandates that a signed copy 
of lhe awar~. woul'Ct be delivered to each party. A signed 
copy of the award would normally be delivered to the 
B 
par~y ~y the arbitrator himself. The High Court clearly 
overlooked that what was required by law was the 
delivery of a copy of the award signed by the members 
of the arbitral tribunal/ arbitrator and not any copy of the 
award. Section 34 of the Act then provides for filing an c 
application for setting aside an arbitral award, and sub-
section (3) of that section lays down the period of 
limitation for making the application. The expression 
" .. party making that application had received the arbitral 
award .. " appearing in sub-section (3) of Section 34 cannot 0 
be read in isolation and it must be understood in light of 
what is said earlier in section 31(5) that requires a signed 
copy of the award to be delivered to each party. Reading 
the two provisions together would make it clear that the 
limitation prescribed under section 34(3) would 
E 
commence only from the date a signed copy of the award 
is delivered to the party making the application for setting 
it aside. [Para 10, 11) [439-F-H; 440-A-G] 
Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors 
(2005) 4 sec 239 - relied on. 
F 
1.2. The period of limitation prescribed under section 
34(3) of the Act would start running only from the date a 
signed copy of the award is delivered to/received by the 
party making the application for setting it aside under G 
section 34(1) of the Act. If the law prescribes that a copy 
of the order/award is to be communicated, delivered, 
dispatched, forwarded, rendered or sent to the parties 
concerned in a particular way and in case the law also 
H 
434 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2011] 4 S.C.R. 
A sets a period of limitation for challenging the order/award 
in question by the aggrieved party, then the period of 
limitation can only commence from the date on which the 
order/award was received by the party concerned in the 
manner prescribed by the law. The High Court 
B overlooked that what section 31 (5) contemplated was not 
merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but 
a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members 
of the arbitral tribunal. In the facts of the case, the 
appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage 
c due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a 
signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a 
copy of the award to them by the claimant-respondent 
but that would not change the legal position and it would 
be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a 
D particular case. [Par

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