THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. versus SHRI PRABHAKAR BHIKAJI INGLE

Citation: [1996] 3 S.C.R. 211 · Decided: 11-03-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. 
A 
v. 
SHRI PRABHAKAR BHIKAJI INGLE 
MARCH 11, 1996 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] 
B 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : Order 47, Rule I. 
Review-Administrative Tribunal-Removal of employee frorm ser-
vice-Confirmation of removal order by Tribunal-Special Leave against C 
Order of Tribunal-Dismissal of SLP by Supreme Court by a non-speaking 
order-Supreme Court's order communicated to Tribunal-Thereafter 
Tribunal reviewing its own Ordei--Exercise of review powei-Held deleterious 
to judicial discipline-Once the order passed is confirmed by Supreme Court 
that becomes final-Thereafter Tribunal cannot review its order which stands 
merged with the order passed by this Court. 
D 
Consititution of India, 1950 : Article 136 
Special Leave Petition-Dismissal-Non speaking order-Thereafter 
review by Administrative Tribunal-Principle of res judicat,,_Applicability of E 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : Section 11. 
Res judicata-l'rinciple of-What is. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4505 of F 
1996. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.11.95 of the Maharashtra 
High Court in R.P. No. 22/95 in O.A. No. 1169 of 1993. 
S.K Dholakia and D.M. Nargolkar for the Appellants. 
AP. Mohanty for the Respondents. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
Leave granted. 
211 
• 
G 
H 
212 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1996] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
We have heard the counsel on both sides. Admittedly, the respon-
B 
dent had filed 0.A. No. 1169/93 in the Maharashtra Administrative 
Tribunal, Bombay against the order passed by the Commissioner of Police, 
Bombay removing him from service. The Commissioner had exercised his 
power under Art. 311(2)(b) of the Constitution holding that in the cir-
cumstances it was not practicable to conduct an enquiry against the respon-
dent. That order came to be confirmed by the Tribunal dismissing the O.A. 
on March 6, 1995. Against that, the respondent filed SLP (C) No. 11433/95 
which was dismissed by this Court on 25.8.95. Pending the SLP, the 
respondent filed a review application in the Tribunal. The Tribunal after 
receipt of the order passed by this Court dismissing the SLP, by the 
C impugned order dated 2.11.95 reviewed the order and set aside the order 
of dismissal. Thus this appeal by special leave. 
It is contended for the respondent that the dismissal of the SLP does 
not preclude the Tribunal from reviewing the order since the dismissal was 
D 
a non-speaking order. We fail to appreciate the contention of the respon-
dent. It is true that this Court has held that the dismissal of SLP without 
speaking order does not constitute res judicata. The principle of res judicata 
is founded on public policy that the parties cannot be permitted to have 
the controversy directly or substantially in issue between the same parties 
or those claiming under the parties in the subsequent suit in the same 
E 
proceedings in the subsequent stages cannot be raised once over. It is a 
sound principle of public policy to prevent vaxation. 
But in this case, when the self-same main order was confirmed by 
this Court, the question arises whether the Tribunal has had power under 
p 
Order 47, Rule 1 CPC or any other appropriate provision under the 
Tribunals Act to review the orders passed by it and confirmed by this Court 
by refusing to grant leave. We find that the exercise of the review power 
is deleterious to the judicial discipline. Once this Court has confirmed the 
order passed by the Tribunal, that becomes final. Therefore, the Tribunal 
cannot have any power to review the previous order which stands merged 
G 
with the order passed by this Court. 
It is next contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that 
though the Tribunal was communicated with the order of this Court dated 
25.8.95, it has thereafter passed the order. It would mean that though it 
H 
had knowledge of dismissal of the order passed by this Court, the Tribunal 
• 
STATEv. P.B. INGLE 
213 
has exercised the power of review and that, therefore, it cannot be said lo A 
be illegal. We are wholly unable to appreciate the contention of the Ie.arncd 
counsel. We could appreciate that if the Tribunal had no knowledge of 
dismissal of the SLP it might, in certain circumstances, revie\v its earlier 
order, e.g., if it was found that the order was vitiated by any manifest error 
of law apparent on the face of the record. But having received the com-
munication that this Court has already 

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