THE STATE OF KERALA ETC. ETC, versus K. P. GOVINDAN TAPIOCA EXPORTER ETC. ETC.
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A B c 635 THE STATE OF KERALA ETC. ETC, v. K. P. GOVINDAN TAPIOCA EXPORTER ETC. ETC. November 7, 1974 [A. N. RAv, C.J., K. K. MATHEW, N. L. UNTWALIA JJ.] Essential Commodities Act 1955-The Kera/a Tapioca Manufacture and Export (Control) Order 1966-Administrative surcharged levied under a scheme formulated by the State Go1•ernment-Scheme not under any provisio11 of the Act, if surcharge could be levied. The Kerala Tapioca Manufacture and Export '(Control) Order, 1966 was made by the State Government under the Essential CQmmodities Act 1955. Even before the promulgation of that order the State Government levied an administrative surcharge under a scheme formulated· by it. The respondents' plea that the levy of administrative surcharge was ultra vfres the State Govern- ment and unwarranted by law had been accepted by the High Court and their writ petitions were allowed. On an .appeal by the State it was contended that the administrative surcharge on the export of tapioca was in effect and substance a liccmce fee charged in exercise of the police powers of the State for granting permission to export Tapioca. D Dismissing the appeal, E F G H HELD : The .administrative surcharge levied by the State Government on the export of tapioca was bad. The realisations were without the authority of law. Assuming that the State has got the police power to charge licence fee, the levies were bad as they were not levies of licence fee for regulating the. trade or for grant of permits. The scheme was not an 'order under any of the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act. In substance and in effect it was an impost on export which indisputably the State had no power to do. The Kerala Tapioca Manufacture Export (Control) Order 1966 did not provide for imposi- tion of any licence fee for the grant of permits for export of tapioca. For the appellants : Examining the Act and the provisions of the Section as a whole it is manifest that an order providing for the granting of a licence or permit and charging for fees is still an order under Sec. 3 (I). An order of the nature mentioned in Sec. 3 (2) (ii) is an order for maintaining -0r increasing supplies of essential commodities and for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. It is manifestly n~t an order f ren- dering any services and admittedly no service is rendered under the provisions of Sec. 3. The power itself is simply for the benefit of the community at large. Thus Sec. 3(2)(ii). does not provide for a fee for services rendered. It is mani- fest from the scheme as a whole that export is banned except under a permit. The imposition is connected and is for the purposes of permission to export; is precisely what the licence fee may mean. The ground, therefore on which the High Court has acted is erroneous. For th"· respondents : Power under the Essential Commodities Act to make orders under Section 3(1) and (2) vested in the Central Government. Under Section 5 of the Cent- ral Government can delegate its powers to State Government subject to such conditions as it may choose to imoose. The Central Government has limited the powers to delegate by Resolution No. GSR 906 dated 9-6-1966. It delegates the powers under Section 3 ( l) for the purposes stated in the different clauses of Sec- tion 3(2). The general power of regulation claimed by the appellant is there- fore not available. 636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] 2 S.C.R. Sec.ond clause in : the delegation •provides that in matters which affect trans- · A port etc. of the commodity wc1uld require the sanction of the Central Govern- ment. Since imposition of export duty restricts the transport of tile commodity, sanciion would be required, which is absent in this case. T)lis also would in· validate the lew. The levy is really not a licence fees but is on export as it clearly purports to be and is a tax. Under rcgUlating powers no such .tax can be _imposed. Article 366(28) defines a tax in wide terms and all imposts would be tax. Viewed from the point of view of even reiUfatory Impost, it is clearly a tax for levyin~ which Article 26S requires a legislative en~ctmcnt. All taxing statutes must in clear language authorise the levy, and if authorised it must be within the legislatiYe (;Ompetence of the State. Admittedly there ls no legislation. The Central Gov· ernment alono would have tl~c power to levy the tax and not the Stat
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