THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR versus B. R. MURALIDHAR & ORS.

Citation: [2022] 10 S.C.R. 448 · Decided: 28-07-2022 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.M. KHANWILKAR · Disposal: Disposed off

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Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 10 S.C.R.
   [2022] 10 S.C.R. 448
448
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.
v.
B. R. MURALIDHAR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1966 of 2013)
JULY 28, 2022
[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Land Acquisition: Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1973 – ss.17, 18, 20 – Constitutional validity of
s.20 of 1973 Act – Amount payable in respect of land acquired –
Acquisition notification u/s. 17 of 1973 Act issued by the Housing
Department of State in 2005 – Writ petition filed before High Court
contending that notification was issued without adequately
considering the objections taken by the writ petitioners and in excess
of the power vested in the authority and second plea was about the
lapsing of the acquisition which was in furtherance of the show
cause notice issued under the 1973 Act – Single Judge did not set
aside the impugned notification, however, held that s.20 of the 1973
Act was ultra vires and opined that the method of determining the
amount to be paid to the land losers pursuant to acquisition of land
was not just and reasonable – It ought to be as per the prevailing
market value of the land; and not on the basis of “three hundred
times the property tax payable” in respect of such land, as per s.20
of the 1973 Act – And, until a just method for determination of
amount was replaced by a law made by the State Legislature, the
land losers ought to be paid amount in accordance with ss.23 and
24 of the 1894 Act – Division Bench upheld the declaration given
by the Single Judge about s.20 being unconstitutional, however,
modified the operative direction given regarding method of
determining the amount payable to the land losers and observed
that such a direction would be beyond the purview of the Court’s
jurisdiction and that it is always open to the State to bring suitable
amendment to s.20 – Division Bench noted that the 1973 Act cannot
get any immunity under Art. 31C of Constitution since the present
Act has been enacted prior to the 44th Amendment – On appeal,
held: High Court disposed of the assail to the validity of s.20 of the
1973 Act in a cryptic manner and more so without analysing all
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relevant aspects needed to be considered by a Constitutional Court
to declare provisions enacted by the State Legislature as ultra vires
– High Court ought to have examined the scheme of the 1973 Act,
its objects and purposes and also whether the payment of amount
specified as three hundred times the property tax payable in respect
of such land on the date of publication would be a permissible
method of determination of the amount or is per se unjust, unfair or
unreasonable – Additionally, if the 1973 Act and the provisions are
ascribable to the objective predicated in Art. 39(b) of the
Constitution, then it would get protection or immunity from challenge
in terms of Arts. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution – Also even if the
High Court was right in observing that the 1973 Act came into force
prior to coming into force of 44th Amendment to the Constitution
on 20.06.1979, it would make no difference as Art. 31C was already
in force with effect from 20.04.1972 to the extent it has been validated
by this Court in Keshavananda Bharti – Matter remitted to High Court
for reconsideration of writ petitions including question of
constitutional validity of s.20 of the 1973 Act – Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 – ss. 23, 24 – Constitution of India – Art.19(1)(f), 31C,
39(b).
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The High Court had held that in absence of an
express provision regarding lapsing of acquisition in the 1973
Act unlike the 1894 or 2013 Act, it is not open to grant relief of
setting aside impugned notification dated 23.6.2005 on account
of efflux of time. In that, show cause notice (preliminary
notification) is ordinarily issued when the competent authority is
satisfied that for the purpose of executing any work of
improvement in relation to any “slum area” or any building in
such area or for the purpose of redeveloping any “slum clearance
area”, or for the purpose of rehabilitating slum dwellers, it is
necessary to acquire any land and it has been so decided in
pursuance of the said provision. The need to develop the slum
area and to rehabilitate the slum dwellers is a continuing obligation
of the State until it is fully discharged. The fact that there is some
time gap between the preliminary notice to show cause why the
land in question should no

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