THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. versus MIS HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD.

Citation: [2017] 13 S.C.R. 1009 · Decided: 14-12-2017 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DIPAK MISRA · Disposal: Disposed off

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2017] 13 S.C.R. 1009 
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. 
v. 
MIS HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD. 
(Civil Appeal No. I 093 of2006) 
DECEMBER 14,2017 
[DIPAK MISRA, CJT, A.K. SIKRI, A.M. KHANWILKAR, 
DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.] 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: ss. 31, 30 and 33 -
Jurisdiction of the Courts - Entertainability of application by 
Supreme Court for making an award passed by the arbitral tribunal, 
when it retains seisin over arbitral proceeding, as Rule of the Court 
-
Held: Superior court is not expected in law to assume jurisdiction 
on the foundation that it is a higher court and further opining that 
all contentions are open - Solely because a superior court appoints 
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the arbitrator or issues directions or has retained some control over 
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the arbitrator by requiring him to file the award in this Court, it 
cannot be regarded as a court of.first instance as that would go 
contrary to the definition of the term 'court' as used in the dictionary 
clause as well as in s. 31 ( 4) - This Court cannot curtail the right of 
a litigant to prefer an appeal by stating that the doors are open to 
this Court and to consider it as if it is an original court - When 
arbitrator is not appointed under the Act and the matter is challenged 
before the High Court or, Supreme Court and, eventually, an 
arbitrator is appointed and some directions are issued, it will be not 
be appropriate to say that the superior court has the jurisdiction to 
deal with the objections .filed u/ss. 30 and 33 - Jurisdiction of a 
Court conferred under a statute cannot be allowed to shift or become 
flexible because of a superior courts interference in the matter in a 
different manner. 
Disposing of the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 Section 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act, 1996 deals with the jurisdiction of the Courts. Sub-section 
(1) stipulates that subject to the provisions of the Act, an award 
may be filed in any court having jurisdiction in the matter to which 
the reference relates. Sub-section (2) Jays down that 
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1010 
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B 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] l 3 S.C.R. 
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time 
being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, all 
questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award 
or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement 
or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the court in 
which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed, 
and by no other Court. IPara 47] 11044-D-F] 
1.2 Interpreting section 31(4), the three-Judge Bench in 
* K11mbha Mawji case held that the object of the said sub-section 
is apparently to go further than sub-section (3), that is, not merely 
casting on the party concerned an obligation to file all applications 
in one court for vesting exclusive jurisdiction for such applications 
in the court in which the first application has been already made. 
The interpretation placed by the three-Judge Bench is to the 
effect that on a comprehensive view of Section 31 that while the 
first sub-section determines the jurisdiction of the court in which 
an award can be filed, sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) are intended 
to make that jurisdiction effective in three different ways, (1) by 
vesting in one court the authority to deal with all questions 
regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an 
arbitration agreement, (2) by casting on the persons concerned 
the obligation to file all applications regarding the conduct of 
arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such 
proceedings in one court, and (3) by vesting exclusive jurisdiction 
in the court in which the first application relating to the matter is 
filed. The further analysis of the Court is that the context of sub-
section (4) would seem to indicate that the sub-section was not 
meant to be confined to applications made during the pendency 
of an arbitration. The necessity for clothing a single court with 
effective and exclusive jurisdiction, and to bring about by the 
combined operation of the three provisions the avoidance of 
conflict and scramble is equally essential whether the question 
arises during the pendency of the arbitration or after the arbitration 
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is completed or before the arbitration is commenced. There is 
no conceivable reason that the legislature has intended to confine 
the operation of sub-section (4) only to applica

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