THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. versus MIS. GUJARAT AMBUJA CEMENTS LTD. & ORS.
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[2017] 10 S.C.R. I THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. MIS. GUJARAT AMBUJA CEMENTS LTD. & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 2652 of2006) OCTOBER 04, 2017 [RANJAN GOGOi AND NAVIN SINHA, JJ.] A B Electricity: Power Tariff Freeze - Benefit of - Cement manufacturing unit's entitlement to the benefit of power tariff freeze, whether includes right to reimbursement of all the amounts paid by C the industrial unit on account of Peak Load Exemption Charge (PLEC) - Held: Company-industrial unit was clearly informed that the State is going through a phase of acute shortage of power affecting peak load hour supply - Board accorded sanction for supply of electricity during peak load hours to the unit subject to certain terms and conditions - Furthermore, by notification dated D 30. I 0. I 995, power during peak hours was to be provided as a special dispensation for industries which could not afford to remain without continuous power/electricity - Normal supply of electricity for which there was a normal tariff was infact discontinued during the peak hours ,,.. Thus, incentive provided under the Incentive Rules E would not include PLEC - Company not entitled to reimbursement towards PLEC paid by it during the period of four years commencing from the date of commercial production, for availing power supply by way of special dispensation - Any reimbursement made to the company to be returned to the State/Board with interest @ 6% p.a. - Revised Rules regarding Grant of Incentive to Industrial Units in F Himachal Pradesh, I 99 I Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 It is abundantly clear from the sequence of facts that what was provided for by way of an incentive under the Incentive Rules framed under the Industrial Policy of the State is ยท G 'power tariff freeze' for a period of four years from the date of commercial production by reimbursement of the amount of increase in tariff during the said period of four years. Even before' the cement manufacturing unit had gone into the commercial production, by letter dated 28.01.1994 the respondents-writ H 1 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] IO S.C.R. A petitioners were clearly informed that the State is going through a phase of acute shortage of power affecting peak load hour supply. The schedule of tariff published by the Board by Notification dated 31.05.1994 made an unequivocal reiteration on the part of the Board that power supply during peak load hours, as may be notified by the Board from time to time, shall not be available B and in case of continuous process and like industries electricity supply during peak load hours would be provided only for special reasons and by means of a separate agreement to be entered into with the Board. In fact, an Office order dated 23.08.1995 was passed by the Chief Engineer (Commercial) of the Board C according sanction for supply of electricity during peak load hours to the respondents-writ petitioners' unit subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein. Finally by notification dated 30.10.1995 another schedule of tariff was published levying peak load exemption charge (PLEC) at the rate of Rs.11- per unit over D and above the normal tariff. Power during peak hours was to be provided as a special dispensation for industries which could not afford to remain without continuous power/electricity. The mode of making available the power was also different inasmuch as the Notification dated 30.10.1995 contemplated installation of separate meters for the said purpose. In the counter affidavit E filed by the Board before this Court it has been stated that power, to make electricity supply available during the peak load hours, was obtained from other sources. The normal supply of electricity for which there was a normal tariff was in fact discontinued during the peak hours. Normal supply of electricity therefore, has to be F distinguished from the supply of electricity during peak load hours which was an act of special dispensation and upon payment of PLEC which change, in the facts noted, would assume the character of a surcharge. The question is not one whether PLEC is a part of the tariff having regard to the dictionary and the natural meaning of the word 'tariff'. The question is how the word/ G expression 'tariff' is to be understood in the context in which such meaning is required to be determined. The meaning that has to be assigned must, naturally, be contextual having
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