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THE STATE OF BIHAR versus RAMBALAK SINGH AND OTHERS

Citation: [1966] 3 S.C.R. 344 · Decided: 17-01-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

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Judgment (excerpt)

TIIE STATE OF BIHAR 
v. 
RAMBALAK SINGH AND OTHERS 
January 17, 1966 
[P.B. GAJF.NDRAGADKAR, C. J., J. C. SnAH, S. M. S1KRI, 
V. RAMASWAMI AND P. SATYANARAYANA RAJU, JJ.] 
Constitu1ion of India, Art. 226,-Habeas Corpus 
proceedingr-wlie-
ther Jligh l'our1 has jurisdiction to grant interim bail where detention is 
under R. 30. Defence of India Rules, 1962. 
The respondent, who was ordered to be detained under Rule 30 of the 
Defence of India Rules, 
1962, filed a petition in the High Court for a 
writ of habeas corpus. The High Court passed an order releasing the 
respondent on interim bail. 
In the appeal to this Court against the said order, it was contended, 
Inter a/la, on behalf of the appellant slate that although ordinarily tho 
High Court may have juri•diction to graat interim bail in habeas corpus 
proceediDgi, this was not so in cases where a detenu 
is detained under 
R. 30; the policy underlying the enactment of the Defonce of hldia Act 
and the Rules and the object intended to be achieved by the detention 
which i• authorised under R. 30, clearly indicated that there were other 
valid considerations of paramount 
importance 
which di')tinguished the 
detention made under R. 30 and th•! altered the character of the pro-
ceedings initiated by or on behalf of the delenu under Art. 226; that ill 
sm:h proceedings the Court could not ignore the fact that the detention 
is purported to have been made in order to safeguard the 
Defence of 
India and Civil Defence, Public Safety, 
clc.; that the very object of 
making an order of detention against a c:tizen is to put an end to his 
prejudicial activities which are likely 
to affect one or the other of tho 
mallers of grave public 
importance 
specified 
by R. 30 and it would 
the'refore be illogical to hold that even before the Court comes 
to any 
decision as to the merits of the grounds on which the order of detention 
is challenged, it would be open to the Court to pass an interim order of 
bail; that furthermore any order of bail pa.<sed 
in such 
proceedings 
would not be interim but would be final and this also distinguished cases 
of this character from other habeas corpus proceedings. 
HELD : 
In dealing with habea.r corpus petitions under Art. 
226 
where orders of detention passed under R. 30 are challenged the High 
Conn has jurisdiction to grant bail, but the exercise of the said jurisdiction 
is inevi1ably circumc;crihed by the considerations which 
are special 
to 
such proceedings and which have relevctnce to the object which ia intended 
to be served by orders of detention properly and validly passed under the 
said Rules. (351 DJ 
Special Reference No. I of 1964 (1965] I S.C.R. 413; S1a1e of Ori.r.ra 
v. Madan Gopa/ Rung/a and others, (1952] S.C.R. 28; referred to. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
If on proof of certain 
conditions or grounds it is oocn to the 
High 
Court to set aside the order of detention made under R. 30 and direct 
the release of the detenu. then it cannot be held that in a proper case 
II 
the Hieh Court has no iurkdiction to make an interim order f?ivin'! 
the 
detenu ·the relief which the High C.curt would be entitled to give him at 
the end of the proceedings. [348 CJ 
, 
; 
--
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
"')',_. 
• 
_.. 
H 
B!HAR v. RAMBALAK (Gajendraxadkar, C.J.) 
345 
It cannot also be said that the jurisdiction of the High Court to pass 
interim auxiliary orders under Art. 226 is taken away by necessary impli-
cation when the High Court is dealing with habeas corpus petitions in 
relation to orders of detention passed under R. 30. [348 G] 
It is only when the High Court is satisfied that prima facie thore is 
something patently illegal in the order of detention that an order for bail 
would be passed. 
The jurisdiction of the High Court to pass an interim 
order does not depend upon the nature of the order but its authority to 
give interim relief to a party which is auxiliary to the main relief to which 
the party would be enhtled if he succeeds in his petition. [349 E] 
The jurisdiction of the High Court to grant relief to tho detenu in 
such proceedings is very narrow and very limited and that being so, if 
the Court takes the view that prima facie the allegations in a petition dis-
close a serious defect in the order of detention which would justify the 
release of the detenu, the wiser and the more sensible and reasonable course 
to adopt would invariably be to expedite the hearing of the writ petition 
and deal with the merits w

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