THE STATE OF BIHAR versus RAMBALAK SINGH AND OTHERS
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TIIE STATE OF BIHAR v. RAMBALAK SINGH AND OTHERS January 17, 1966 [P.B. GAJF.NDRAGADKAR, C. J., J. C. SnAH, S. M. S1KRI, V. RAMASWAMI AND P. SATYANARAYANA RAJU, JJ.] Constitu1ion of India, Art. 226,-Habeas Corpus proceedingr-wlie- ther Jligh l'our1 has jurisdiction to grant interim bail where detention is under R. 30. Defence of India Rules, 1962. The respondent, who was ordered to be detained under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, filed a petition in the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The High Court passed an order releasing the respondent on interim bail. In the appeal to this Court against the said order, it was contended, Inter a/la, on behalf of the appellant slate that although ordinarily tho High Court may have juri•diction to graat interim bail in habeas corpus proceediDgi, this was not so in cases where a detenu is detained under R. 30; the policy underlying the enactment of the Defonce of hldia Act and the Rules and the object intended to be achieved by the detention which i• authorised under R. 30, clearly indicated that there were other valid considerations of paramount importance which di')tinguished the detention made under R. 30 and th•! altered the character of the pro- ceedings initiated by or on behalf of the delenu under Art. 226; that ill sm:h proceedings the Court could not ignore the fact that the detention is purported to have been made in order to safeguard the Defence of India and Civil Defence, Public Safety, clc.; that the very object of making an order of detention against a c:tizen is to put an end to his prejudicial activities which are likely to affect one or the other of tho mallers of grave public importance specified by R. 30 and it would the'refore be illogical to hold that even before the Court comes to any decision as to the merits of the grounds on which the order of detention is challenged, it would be open to the Court to pass an interim order of bail; that furthermore any order of bail pa.<sed in such proceedings would not be interim but would be final and this also distinguished cases of this character from other habeas corpus proceedings. HELD : In dealing with habea.r corpus petitions under Art. 226 where orders of detention passed under R. 30 are challenged the High Conn has jurisdiction to grant bail, but the exercise of the said jurisdiction is inevi1ably circumc;crihed by the considerations which are special to such proceedings and which have relevctnce to the object which ia intended to be served by orders of detention properly and validly passed under the said Rules. (351 DJ Special Reference No. I of 1964 (1965] I S.C.R. 413; S1a1e of Ori.r.ra v. Madan Gopa/ Rung/a and others, (1952] S.C.R. 28; referred to. A B c D E F G If on proof of certain conditions or grounds it is oocn to the High Court to set aside the order of detention made under R. 30 and direct the release of the detenu. then it cannot be held that in a proper case II the Hieh Court has no iurkdiction to make an interim order f?ivin'! the detenu ·the relief which the High C.curt would be entitled to give him at the end of the proceedings. [348 CJ , ; -- A B c D E F G "')',_. • _.. H B!HAR v. RAMBALAK (Gajendraxadkar, C.J.) 345 It cannot also be said that the jurisdiction of the High Court to pass interim auxiliary orders under Art. 226 is taken away by necessary impli- cation when the High Court is dealing with habeas corpus petitions in relation to orders of detention passed under R. 30. [348 G] It is only when the High Court is satisfied that prima facie thore is something patently illegal in the order of detention that an order for bail would be passed. The jurisdiction of the High Court to pass an interim order does not depend upon the nature of the order but its authority to give interim relief to a party which is auxiliary to the main relief to which the party would be enhtled if he succeeds in his petition. [349 E] The jurisdiction of the High Court to grant relief to tho detenu in such proceedings is very narrow and very limited and that being so, if the Court takes the view that prima facie the allegations in a petition dis- close a serious defect in the order of detention which would justify the release of the detenu, the wiser and the more sensible and reasonable course to adopt would invariably be to expedite the hearing of the writ petition and deal with the merits w
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