THE STATE OF BIHAR versus HIRALAL KEJRIWAL AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1960] 1 S.C.R. 726 · Decided: 14-09-1959 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SYED JAFFER IMAM · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

726 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)) 
r959 
s. 25E of the Act. It was conceded on behalf the 
, 
.-d 
respondent workmen that the lay-off in the factory was 
nsso"ate Cement d 
1 
f l' 
b 
f 
Companies 
ue to the non-supp y o 
Imestone y reason o the 
v. 
strike in the limestone quarry and the strike was 
Their Workmen decided on by the same Union which consisted of the 
workmen at the factory and the quarry. 
That being 
5• K. Das J. 
the position, the disqualification in cl. (iii) aforesaid 
clearly applied and the workmen at the factory were 
not entitled to claim lay-off compensation. 
r959 
September z4 
The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds 
and is allowed and the award of the Industrial Tribu-
nal is set aside. In the circumstances of the ·case in 
which a difficult question of interpretation arose for 
decision for the first time, we pass no order as to 
costs. 
Appeal allowed. 
THE STATE OF BIHAR 
v. 
HIRALAL KEJRIWAL AND ANOTHER 
(SYED JAFER IMAM and K. SuBBA RAo, JJ.) 
Repeal of Statute-Saving clause-Interpretation of-Cotton 
Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, r948, whether continues in 
force-Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, r946 (XXIV oj 
r946),, ss. r(3) and 3(r)-Essential Commodities Ordinance, r955, 
(Ordinance I of r955), s. r6-Esscntial Commodities Act, r955 (X of 
r955), S, I6. 
Appeal by special leave-Interference in-Constitution of India, 
Art. r36. 
In exercise of the powers under s. 3 of the Essential Supplies 
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, the Central Government made the 
Cotton Textile (Control of Movement) Order, 1948. The 1946 
Act was to expire on January 26, 1955, but before that, on 
January 21, l<j55, the Essential Commodities Ordinance was 
promulgated which conferred on the Central Government a power 
similar to that conferred by s. 3 of the 1946 Act. Section 16 of 
the Ordinance provided that all Orders made under the 1946 Act 
in so far as such Orders could be made under the Ordinance shall 
continue in force and that accordingly any appointment made, 
license or permit granted or direction issued under any such 
Order shall continue in force. The Essential Commodities Act, 
1955 by s. l6(1)(a) repealed the Ordinance and by s, l6(1)(b) 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
727 
repealed any other law in force in any State in so far as such law 
z959 
controlled the production, supply and distribution of, and trade 
~-
. 
and commerce in any essential commodity. The savings clause The State of Bihar 
s. 16(2) of the 1955 Act was a repetition of s. 16 of the Ordinance. H" 1 /k . . 1 
The respondent contended that the amplitude of the first part of 
ira; A e{~iwa 
s. 16 of the Ordinance was cut down by the second part and 
an 
no er 
consequently s. 16 did not save the Order but only the acts done 
under the Order, and that even if the Order was saved by s. 16 
of the Ordinance it was repealed by s. l6(1)(b) of the 1955 Act 
and was not continued under that Act. 
Held, that the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 
1948 was saved by s. 16 of the Ordinande and was continued by 
s. 16(2) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and was in force 
on August 30, 1955. when the offence was committed. The first 
part of s. 16 of the Ordinance saved the order and the acts done 
under the Order subsequent to the coming into force of the 
Ordinance and the second part of s. 16 saved past acts done under 
the Order before the coming into force of the Ordinance. The 
words "any other law" in s. 16(1)(b) of the 1955 Act meant any 
law other than the Ordinance and an order made or deemed to 
be made under the Ordinance was not repealed by s. l6(1)(b). 
Such an order was saved by s. l6(1)(a) of the Act. 
Held, further, that this was not a fit case for interference 
under Art. 136 of the Constitution with the order of the High 
Court discharging the respondent. The offence was committed 
more than four years ago; the application by the appellant to the 
High Court for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme 
Court was belated ; there was plausible justification for the belief 
of the accused that the Order did not survive the expiry of the 
1946 Act in view of the varying views expressed by the Courts; 
the State filed the appeal presumably to get the legal position 
clarified ; in such circumstances public interest did not require 
that the stale matter should be resuscitated. 
CRIMINAL 
APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION: 
Criminal 
Appeal No. 36of1958, 
Appeal by special l

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