THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND ANR. versus P.R. SRIRAMULU AND ANR.
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... THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND ANR. A v. P.R. SRIRAMULU AND ANR. NOVEMBER 22, 1995 B [S.P. BHARUCHA, FAIZAN UDDIN AND S.B. MATMUDAR, JJ.] Tamil Nadu Cowt Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955-Levy of Court fee on ad-valorem scale without upper limit-Validity-Essential characters of fee-Feasibility of a fixed maximum chargeable fe~eed for unifonnity in scales of Court fees through country-Economic and social policy of C State-Court's power to inteifere. The respondents No. 1 and 2 challenged the validity of the provisions of levy of Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act of 1955 with reference to levy of Court Fees ad-valorem working out at the rate of 7 1/2 percent without D upper limit by contending that the levy was not only exorbitant but wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and unjustified bearing no relationship to the cost of administration of justice; that it was not a levy of Court fee but really a levy of tax though purporting to be a levy of fee; that the Court fees must be related to the cost of administration of justice and cannot be used as a means of taxation for the purpose of raising the revenue to the Govern- ment for its general administration; that the pattern of levy of Court fees prior to 1955 was only to levy an ad-valorem fee up to a certain limit and thereafter the fee was on a reduced scale and that the scale of fees in other States of the country are also on different basis and not on the basis of E ad-valorem fee without limit. F The High Court allowed the writ petitions and appeal and struck down Article (1) in Schedule (1) to the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 and Sub-rule (1) of Rule (1) of Order II of the High Court Fees Rules 1956 based on Article (1) of Schedule (1) of Madras Act No. XIV of 1955, and held them to be invalid in so-far-as they relate to the G levy of Court Fees on ad-valorem scale. The High Court held that the levy of ad-valorem flat rate of 7 1/2 percent without any upper limit would be unreasonable because where the cost of service had to be distributed between several persons, it would not be equitable and reasonable if the fees were so fixed that the whole costs or a grossly disproportionate part H 551 552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1995] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. A of it was imposed on a particular section of litigants. B In appeal, this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and remitted the matter back to the High Court considering that the appeal could not be disposed of without giving opportunity to the respondent to file an affidavit or affidavits in reply to the supplemental counter affidavit. After remand, the High Court while striking down the provisions held that there was no idea of quid pro quo in the levy at the rate of 7 1/2 percent flat rate without limit as there was no necessity to raise the Court Fees as compensation for the cost of service rendered and to meet any increased cost in the administration of civil justice and there was no principle of C rationalisation justifying demand at a fixed rate; that considering the circumstances the impost inherently bears within it more the concept of tax than fee and the levy imposing, as it does, on a particular section of litigants is grossly dis- proportionate to the burden and the same is unreasonable and arbitrary; that the expenditure incurred by the Govern- ment could not be debited to the cost of administration of justice which D the litigants can be required to compensate and that the expenditure in the administration of Criminal Justice is also not debitable to the cost of administration of Civil Justice in Court and that the record indicated that for the year 1955-56 the State was making a profit varying between 9 to 21 lakhs. This appeal had been filed against the judgment of the High Court. E F G The questions raised for consideration were : (i) what is the nature of the Fees taken in Court within the meaning of Entry 3, List II, in 7th Schedule of the Constitution; (ii) Whether it is a colourable exercise of legislative power, in as much as the State in fact is raising tax under the guise of levying a fee because the levy is excessive to such an extent as to be a pretence of a fee but it is not a fee in reality? (iii) whether the levy of Court Fees on ad valorem basis without an upper limit renders the impost a tax; (iv) Whether the impugned impositions are fees. Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD : 1.1.
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