THE SECRETARY, TALIPARAMBA EDUCATION SOCIETY versus MOOTHEDATH MALLISSERI ILLATH M.N. AND ORS.
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THE SECRETARY, TALIPARAMBA EDUCATION SOCIETY
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v.
MOOTHEDATH MALLISSERI ILLATH M.N. AND ORS.
MARCH 3, 1997
(K. RAMASWAMY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.]
Lease-{]ser of leased propertJTenns of lease-Deed stipulating that
lessor cannot claim to recover property so long as it is used for the purpose
of educational institution-Notice of tennination given-Subsequently suit
C filed on the grounds of trespass into property and user thereof for cultural
purposes and receipt of amount from such user-Held, initially under the
lease, a right of property was actually granted-Trial court and appellate court
recorded concurrent findings that inf act there was no trespass and there is no
misuse or contravention of tenns of the lease-Though some shops were
constmcted on the land and some of the rooms were let out for cultural
D purposes and marriage purposes, but the rent derived therefrom is being used
for the maintenance and mnning of the educational institute-The user was
not detrimental to the purpose for which lease was granted-Educational
institution.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1872 of
E 1997.
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From the Judgment and Order dated 24.6.96 of the Kerala High
Court in S.A. No. 2 of 1993.
C.S. Vaidyanathan and Ramesh Babu M.R. for the Appellant.
T.L.V. Iyer, S. Balakrishnan, A. Raymond, M.K.D. Namboodri and
G. Prakash fot the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
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Leave granted.
This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the learned
Single judge of the Kerala High Court, made on June 24, 1996 in S.A. No.
2/1993.
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The short question that arises for consideration is : whether the
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SECY. TALIPARAMBA EDUCATION SOCY. '· MOOTHEDATH MALLISSERI ILLA TH M.N.
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respondents are enti~ed to terminate that lease granted to the appellant? A
Clause 6 of the lease-deed reads as under :
"The lessee need not surrender and ihe lessor cannot claim to
recover the property or the management of the institution from
the Society so long as it is used for the purpose of an education
institution. But if it over happens that the site and buildings are B
. used for purpose other than those for which they are intended and
or the lessee finds it not possible to manage the institution as an
education institution, the lessor will have the absolute right to
re-entry."
In exercise of the right under the said convent, notice of termination
was given by the respondents. Resultantly, the· respondent~ filed a suit.
Though elaborate contentions were raised for grant of the relief, namely,
user of the property for cultural purposes and receipt of the amount from
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. such user, to allow others to trespass into the property and make use D
ltiereof as grounds to terminate the lease, they were negatived by civil
Court. Incidentally, it was also a lease of the management of the institution.
The trial Court as well· as the appellate Court negatived the contentions
and concurrently upheld the . claim of the appellant that there was no
breach of the covenant. But in the Second Appeal, the learned Judge on
appreciation of evidence has held that the respondents had allowed the E
property to be trespassed, used the property for purposes other than the
one for which it was intended and, therefore, the respondents are entitled
to terminate the lease. Consequently, he decreed the suit. Thus, this appeal
by special leave.
Shri Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, has
contended that in view of the concurrent findings recorded by the courts
below, the view taken by the High Court is wholly unjustifiable. We find
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the contention is well founded. Shri Vishwanatha Iyer, learned senior
counsel for the respondents, has contended that in view of the finding
recorded by the High Court, the various points discussed and the finding G
recorded by the Courts below the claims made out by the respondents to
have the lease terminated· is correct. Initially, under .the lease a right of
property was actually granted. It· was argued that since the property was
misused by the management which• was· handed· over to the appellant, the
respondents are entitled to terminate the lease. We fmd no force in the H
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. SUPREMECOURTREPORTS
[1997] 2 S.C.R .
A contention. The question whether the property was allowed to be
trespassed was gone into by the trial Court and a finding was recorded that
they did not acquiesce to the trespass and in fact there Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
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