THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE versus BABITA PUNIYA & ORS.
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A B C D E F G H 833 THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE v. BABITA PUNIYA & ORS. (Civil Appeal Nos. 9367-9369 of 2011) FEBRUARY 17, 2020 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.] Constitution of India: Arts. 14, 15 (1) and 16(1) – Induction of women in Army under Women Special Entry Scheme (Officers) [WSES] for a period of 5 years – The initial process under WSES replaced by Short Service Commission (SSC) with outer period of fourteen years – Writ petition seeking direction for grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to women SSC officers – High Court held that SSC women officers who had opted for PC and were not granted PC but granted extension of SSC, were entitled to PC at par with male SSC officers – Appeal to Supreme Court – During pendency of the appeal Union Government by its communication dated 25 February 2019 granted PC to SSC women officers in ten arms of services of the Army – Held: The policy decision of Union dated 25 February 2019 must be construed as a decision which enforces the fundamental right of women to seek access to public appointment and to equality of opportunity in public employment as envisaged in Articles 15(1) and 16(1) of the Constitution respectively – However, the distinction sought to be drawn between women officers with less than fourteen years of service, with those having service between fourteen and twenty years and above twenty years, is fallacious – There is no reason to deprive women SSC officers of grant of PC on the ground that they have crossed fourteen years of service because such situation arose only due to delay on part of the Union Government in implementing the order of the High Court – Therefore, women SSC officers both within the period of 14 years of service and beyond, should equally be entitled to consideration for grant of PCs – Also the absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments is not sustainable being against the provisions under Article 14. [2020] 3 S.C.R. 833 833 A B C D E F G H 834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. Art. 33 – Scope of – Held: Limitation or abrogation of fundamental rights in their application to members of Armed Forces u/Art. 33, must be by law enacted to ensure proper discharge of duties and maintenance of discipline. Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. Article 33 of the Constitution empowers Parliament to determine by law the extent to which the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution shall be restricted/ abrogated in their application inter alia to the members of the Armed Forces so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them. The impact of Article 33 is to enable Parliament to limit or abrogate the fundamental rights in their application to the members of the Armed forces. But such a restriction or abrogation must be by law. Moreover, the restriction or abrogation must be enacted to ensure the proper discharge of duties and the maintenance of discipline. [Para 44] [865-E-G] Ram Sarup v. Union of India [1964] 5 SCR 931; Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 140 : [1983] 1 SCR 393; R Viswan v. Union of India (1983) 3 SCC 401 : [1983] (3) SCR 60 – referred to. 2. Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 embodies the principle that a woman would be eligible for enrolment or employment only in such corps, departments, branches or bodies forming part of or attached to the regular Army upon and to the extent notified by the Central Government. In other words, the eligibility of women for enrollment or engagement in the regular Army is conditional on a provision being made by the Central Government in terms of the enabling provision of Section 12. [Para 49] [869-D-F] 3. Following the judgment of the impugned order, the Union Government was under a mandate to grant Permanent Commissions (PCs) to women officers, to the exclusion of the Combat Arms, and at par with the grant of PCs to their male counterparts. Significantly, the impugned judgment was not stayed by this Court at any stage, though there was a direction that no A B C D E F G H 835 coercive steps would be initiated on the basis of the judgment in appeal. A direction by this Court not to initiate coercive steps is distinct from a stay on the operation of the judgment. There was no reason or justification for the Union Government not to act upon the directions that were issued by the High Court in the impugned judgment, particularly, in the absence of a stay on the operation
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