THE SANGRAM SINGH versus ELECTION TRIBUNAL, KOTAH, BHUREY LAL BAYA

Citation: [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1 · Decided: 22-03-1955 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: VIVIAN BOSE

Cited by 12 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

I 
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
SANGRAM SINGH 
v. 
ELECTION TRIBUNAL; KOTAH, 
BHUREY LAL BAY A 
[VIVIAN BosE, B. JAGANNADHADAS and 
BHUVANESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, JJ.) 
Reprcse11tation of tht' People Act (XLIIJ) of 1951, section 
105-Effect of-Finality and condusi"£Jeness of orders of Election 
Tribunals-Article 136 of Constitution-7urisdiction ·of -:supreme 
Court-1urisdiction and powers of High Courts under Article 226 
of the Constitution-Whether in any way affected-Writ of Certio-
rari-Principles governing grant of-Laws of procedure-Ground-
ed on natural justice-Designed to promote justice-Representation 
of the People Act of 1951, sub-section (2) of section 90-Procedure 
for trial of Election petitions-Code of Civil· Procedure, 1908, sec-
tions 27, 30 and 32-Disiinction between "Penalty" for non-appear-
ance of parties to suir and consequences flowing from non-appear-
ance in response to summons---Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 
5, rules 1 and 5 and Order 8, rules 1 and 14, Order 9, rules 6(l)(a), 
2, 7, 12 and 13-0rder 15, rule 3-0rder 17, rules 1(1) and 2-
Trial of suits-First hearing and adjourned hearing-Disfinction-
Conseq11c11ces of 1wn-appearancc-Ex part<! he<1ri11g and 'ex parte 
order-Principles i;m•erning discretion of Courts-Adjournment af 
hearing---{,'om•euiencc of wit11esses. 
Notwithstanding the provision in section 105 of the Represen-
tation of the People Act (Act XLill) of 1951 that every order of an 
Election Tribunal made under the Act shall be final and conclusive, 
the High Court and the Supreme Court have unfettered jurisdic-
tion to examine whether the tribunal, in the exercise of its un-
doubted jurisdiction, has acted kgally or otherwise. This jurisdic-· 
tion cannot be taken away bY. a legislative device that purports to 
confer power on a tribunal to act illegally. The legality of an act 
or conclusion is somethipg that exists outside and apart from the 
decision of an inferior tribunal. It is a part of the law of the land 
which cannot be finally dett"rmined or altered by any tribunal of 
limited jurisdiction. The High Courts and the Supreme Court alone 
can determine what th.: law of the land is i•is-a-vis all other Courts 
and tribunals and they alone can pronounce with authority and 
finality on what is kgal and what is not. All that an inferior tribunal 
can do is to reach a t.:ntativc conclusion which is subject to review 
under Artidt>s 226 and 136 nf the Constitution. The jurisdicti1)n 
of th.: High Courts under Anick 226, with rhat of thi.: Supreme 
Court above them, n:mains to· its fullest extent despite section 105 
1955 
March 22 
1Y55 
Su11gran1 Singh 
v. 
E/e,·1iou Tribunal, 
Ko1uh, Bhurey Lat 
Bay a 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[ 1955] 
of the Representation of the People Act. Limitations on the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction can only be imposed by the Constitution. 
The powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Consti-
tution are i::liscretionary and, though no limits can be placed upon 
that discretion, it must be exercised along recognised lines and not 
arbitrarily. In the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226, 
the High Courts should not act as Courts of Appeal or revision to 
correct mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad 
and general sense. 
It is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in 
mind the policy of the legislature to have disputes about special 
rights, as in election cases, decided as speedily· as may be. The 
High Courts should not therefore en:crtain petitions for prerogative 
writs lightly in this class of case. 
The appellant filed an election petition under section 100 of the 
Representation of the People Act. He appeared on the first and 
subsequeqt hearing at Kotah. The proceedings were then adjourn-
ed for certain hearings at Udaipur. The appellant did not appear on 
the first three hearings at that place so the tribunal proceeded "·' 
parte. His counsel appeared on the fourth hearing but was not 
allowed to take any further part in the proceedings because no good 
cause was shown for the earlier non-appearance and so the tribunal 
refused to set aside its "ex parte order". 
Held, (I) J,Tnder section 90(2) of the Representation of the 
People Act the procedure for the trial of election petition is to b~, 
as near as may be, the same as in the trial of suits under the Civil 
Procedure Code; 
(2) under the Civil Procedure Code there is no such thing as an 
"ex parte order for non-appearance" which precludes 

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