THE RUBY SALES AND SERVICES (P) LTD. AND ANR. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

Citation: [1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 473 · Decided: 28-10-1993 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: KULDIP SINGH, YOGESHWAR DAYAL

Judgment (excerpt)

THE RUBY SALES AND SERVICES (P) LTD. AND ANR. 
A 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. 
OCTOBER 28, 1993 
(KULDIP SINGH AND YOGESHWAR DAYAL, JJ.) 
B 
Bombay Stamps Act, 195rSections 2(g) and 2( /)-'Conveyance' or 
'instrument'-Definition-Consent decree whereunder title lo immovable 
property conveyed-#'hether it amounts to 'Conveyance' or an instrument' C 
within meaning of Act-Held yes. 
The question raised for consi~eration in these appeals was whether 
a consent decree whereunder the title immovable property was conveyed 
expressly fell under the definition of 'Conveyance' under section 2 (g) or an 
'instrument' under section 2(1) of the Bombay Stamps Act, 1958 or such D 
consent decree falls outside the ambit and scope of the definition of 
'conveyance' or 'instrument' under the Act. 
The Single Judge of the High Court while construing these defini· 
tions held that the consent decree did not fall in any of these definitions 
and, therefore, such a decree was not liable for payment of stamp duty. On E 
appeal, the Division Bench took the view that having regard to the recital 
in the consent decree itself the consent decree, on its true interpretation, 
was a conveyance itself and was covered by the definition of 'conveyance' 
under the Act and at any rate the consent decree fulfilled all the require-
ments of transfer under the consent decree in favour of the veridees and 
such a consent decree would be liable to stamp duty entry 25 of Schedule 
I to the Act. The High Court proceeded on the ground that the amendment 
of section 2(g) brought into force on 10th December, 1985 by the 
Maharashtra Act No. 27 of the 1985 was clarificatory and declaratory. 
This appeal was filed against the decision of the Division Bench. 
F 
G 
The appellants submitted that it was only by the 1985 amendment of . 
section 2(g) with effect from 10th December 1985, the decree passed by the 
court had been for the first time introduced in the definition of 
'conveyance'. It was thus submitted that prior to amendment the consent 
decree was not included in the definitions of'conveyance' and instruments'. H 
473. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
474 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
Dismissing the appeal, this Court 
HEJ.,.D : 1.1. The definitions of 'Conveyance' and 'instrument' start 
with the expression 'includes' which shows that the definitions are very 
wide. The amendment was made out of abundant caution and it does not 
mean that the consent decree was not otherwise covered by the definitions 
given In section 2(g) or 2(1) of the Bombay Stamp Act. It depends on the 
terms thereof. Merely because an agreement is put in the shape or the 
consent decree it does not change the contents of the document. It remains 
agreement and it is subjed to all rights and liabilities which any agreement 
may sufYer. Having a stamp or court amxed will not change the nature or 
the document. A compromise decree does not stand on a higher footing 
than the agreement which preceded it. A consent decree ls a mere creature 
of the agreement on which it is founded and is liable to be set aside on any 
of the ground Which will invalidate the agreement. [479·B·E1 
. 
Sharanbasappa Tippanna Indi. v. Sanganbasappa Sridramappa Shah-
pur & Ors., AIR (1935) Bom 256, distinguished. 
1.2. In the instant case, from the recital in the consent decree, there 
was no manner of doubf that the parties to the transaction and the suit 
agree that the consent decree Itself operate as conveyance from defendants 
In favour of the plalntifYs In respect of the suit property. It was clear from 
the terms of the consent decree that It was also an 'instrument' under 
which title had been passed over to the plalntifYs. It was a live document 
transferring the property In dispute from the defendants to the plaintiffs. 
Thus the consent decree fell under the definitions of 'conveyance' as well 
as 'lnstnunent'. (478-B·E] 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3477 of 
1992. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.2.1992 of the Bombay High 
Court in Appeal No. 238/91. 
WITH 
Civil Appeal Nos. 3478, 3479, 3480, 3481, 3482, 4060-4061 or 1992 
and 790 of 1993. 
H 
S. Ganesh, U A Rana, Anand Prasad and Rajiv Tyagi for Mis Gagrat 
,..____ 
·-
RUBYSALESANDSERVICELID. v. STATE [DAYAL,J.) 
475 
It ~. for the Appellants. 
~ ~ 
. 
. 
K. Madhava Reddy,. S.K. Dholakia, S.M. Jadhav and AS. Bhasme 
for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J. Civil Appea

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