THE PROJECT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAYS NO. 45 E AND 220 NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA versus M. HAKEEM & ANR.

Citation: [2021] 5 S.C.R. 368 · Decided: 20-07-2021 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.F. NARIMAN · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · cites 10 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2021] 5 S.C.R.
   [2021] 5 S.C.R. 368
368
THE PROJECT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAYS NO. 45 E
AND 220 NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
v.
M. HAKEEM & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 2756 of 2021)
JULY 20, 2021
[R. F. NARIMAN AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: s.34 – Modification
of award by court, permissibility – Held: Power of a court under
s.34 of the Act, 1996 to “set aside” an award of an arbitrator would
not include the power to modify such an award – To state that the
judicial trend appears to favour an interpretation that would read
into s.34 a power to modify, revise or vary the award would be to
ignore the previous law contained in the 1940 Act; as also to ignore
the fact that the 1996 Act was enacted based on the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 makes
it clear that, given the limited judicial interference on extremely
limited grounds not dealing with the merits of an award, the ‘limited
remedy’ under s.34 is co-terminus with the ‘limited right’, namely,
either to set aside an award or remand the matter under the
circumstances mentioned in s.34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 –
National Highway Authority of India Act, 1956.
National Highway Authority of India Act, 1956: ss.3G, 3H –
The object of the NH Amendment Act, 1997 is to expedite the process
of acquisition – This has been achieved by cutting down the period
for hearing of objections from 30 days under s.5A of the Land
Acquisition Act to 21 days under s.3C of the National Highways
Act – Further, unlike the Land Acquisition Act, the moment a
notification under s.3D(2) of the National Highways Act (equivalent
to s.6 Land Acquisition Act) is made, the land vests absolutely in the
Central Government free from all encumbrances – Thereafter, where
land has vested in the Central Government and the amount
determined by the competent authority under s.3G as compensation
has been deposited by the Central Government in accordance with
s.3H(1), the competent authority may then direct that possession be
taken within 60 days of service of notice by it. Also, injunctions
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against highway projects have now become impossible to obtain in
view of s.20A of the Specific Relief Act, which has been introduced
w.e.f. 01.10.2018 – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.5A, 6.
Land Acquisition: Differential compensation – Held: Cannot
be awarded on the ground that a different public purpose is sought
to be achieved.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. As per NHAI Act, the competent authority, as
defined, in Section 3 (a) is to first determine an amount which is
payable by way of compensation for compulsory acquisition of
land. Under Section 3G(5), if the amount determined by the said
authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount
shall, on application by either of the parties, be determined by an
arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government. The
‘competent authority’ is a person or authority authorised by the
Central Government by notification to determine the amount of
compensation. In the present case, a notification designating a
Special District Revenue Officer as the competent authority has
been made. The amount determined by the aforesaid authority
has then to be sent to an arbitrator, on application by either of
the parties. The said arbitration is not a consensual process with
both parties having a hand in appointing the arbitrator. As a matter
of fact, the land owner has no say in the appointment of the
arbitrator, who is to be appointed only by the acquiring authority,
that is the Central Government. [Para 12][382-C-F]
2. Section 34 provides only for setting aside awards on very
limited grounds, such grounds being contained in sub-sections
(2) and (3) of Section 34. Secondly, as the marginal note of Section
34 indicates, “recourse” to a court against an arbitral award may
be made only by an application for setting aside such award in
accordance with sub-sections (2) and (3). “Recourse” is defined
by P Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd Edition) as
the enforcement or method of enforcing a right. Where the right
is itself truncated, enforcement of such truncated right can also
be only limited in nature.What is clear from a reading of the said
provisions is that, given the limited grounds of challenge under
THE PROJECT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAYS NO. 45 E
AND 220 NHAI v. M. HAKEEM
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[202

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