THE PARBHANI TRANSPORT CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD. versus THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, AURANGABAD AND OTHERS

Citation: [1960] 3 S.C.R. 177 · Decided: 07-03-1960 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 8 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

-· 
3 S.O.R.- SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
177 
.... 4 - expression 'by reason of' goes with the clause relat-
z96o 
ing to compulsory acquisition of property and not James Anderson 
with the distribution of capital assets. 
The position seems to us to be so clear that it is un-
Commi';;ioner of 
necessary to labour it or to refer to decided cases. Inc.-tax, Bombay 
Such decisions of the High Courts as have been 
--
brought to our notice are all one way and they take 
s. K. Das J. 
the same view as was taken by the High Gourt in the 
decision.under appeal (see Sri Kannan Rir,e Mills Ltd. 
v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1); Commis-
sioner of Income-tax, Bombay North v. Walji Damji (2); 
and Gowri Tile Works v. Commissioner of· income-tax, 
Madras (3). 
For the reasons given above, we see no merit in the 
appeal and we dismiss it with costs. 
Appea:l dismissed. 
THE PARBHANI TRANSPORT CO-OPERATIVE 
SOCIETY LTD. 
v. 
THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, 
AURANGABAD AND OTHERS 
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR, 
K. N. W ANCHOO AND J. 0. SHAH, JJ.) 
Motor Vehicles-Grant of stage carriage permit to Government 
under Ch. IV-Constitutional validity--Motor Vehicles Act, I939 
(4 of I9J9), as amended by Act IOO of I956, ch. IV. ss. 42, 47, ch, 
IV A, s. 68F(I)-Constitution of India, Arts. I9(L)(g), I4. 
The petitioner, a registered co-operative societ;r, carrying 
on the business of plying motor buses as stage carriages, had 
permits for four routes which were due to expire. The State 
applied for permits for all these routes under Ch. IV of the 
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by Act roo of 1956, and 
the petitioner applied for renewal of its own permits. The 
Regional Transport Authority rejected the petitioner's applica-
tions and granted those of the State. The petitioner's appeal to 
the State Transport Authority was rejected. But the High 
Court quashed the said orders under Art. 226 and directed a 
(I) [1954] 26 I.T.R. 3.~I. 
(.?) (1955] 28 I.T.R. 914. 
(3) [I9,57] 3I I. T.R. 250. 
2J 
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Match 7 
I 
•
I
178 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1960] 
z960 
reconsideration of the matter. The State published a scheme 
under s. 68C, Ch. IV A, of the Act. The scheme was not however 
Pat;bhani Transpo1t finalised. Thereafter the Regional Transport Authority, purpor-
Co-op. 
ting to reconsider the matter as directed by the High Court, 
Society Ltd. 
· rejected the petitioner's applications for rene\val and granted 
v. 
those of the State for permits. It was contended on behalf of 
R. T. A. 
the petitioner that in view of Ch. IV A of the Act, the State had 
Aurangabad 
no right to apply for pern1its except thereunder and the grant 
of permits on applieations made under Ch. IV was, therefore, 
illegal and infringed the petitioner's fundamental ri~hts under 
Ans. rg(r)(g) of the Constitution. It was further contended that 
the order violated Art. r4 as well. 
Held, that both the contentions were without substance and 
must fail. 
' 
The Motor Vehicles Act, r939, as amended by Act roo of 
r956, Jays down two independent sets of provisions relating to 
running of buses by the Government, one under Ch. IV and the 
other Ch. IV A of the Act. The latter chapter by s. 68F(r) 
confers a special advantage on the Government when it proceeds 
under that chapter and entitles it to the necessary permits as a 
matter of right. 
Under Ch. IV of the Act, however, the Govern-
ment cannot claim any such advantage. It has to compete with 
other applicants. The powers conferred by the two chapters 
being thus not one but two different powers, the principle 
enunciated in Nazir Ahmad's case has no application. 
Since, 
therefore, the Government had a distinct right to apply for 
permits under Ch. IV of the Act, no question of applying for 
permits without the right to do so and thereby infringing the 
petitioner's fundamental right under Art. r9(r)(g) could arise. 
Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, (r936) L.R. 63 I.A. 372, held 
inapplicable. 
Taylor v, Taylor, (r876) r Ch. D. 426, distinguished. 
Nor could the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alter£us be ()f 
any help to the petitioner. That maxim has its utility in 
ascertaining the intention of the legislature. Since s. 42(3)(a) of 
the Motor Vehicles Act leaves no manner of doubt as to that 
intention by its clear indication that the Government cannot run 
buses as a commercial enterprise without first obtaining permits 
under s. 42(r) of the Act, that maxim cannot operate so as to 
imply

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