THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR AND ANR. versus SHAH HYDER BEIG AND ORS.

Citation: [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 197 · Decided: 08-12-1999 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.B. MAJMUDAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR AND ANR. 
A 
v. 
SHAH HYDER BEIG AND ORS. 
DECEMBER 8, 1999 
[S.B. MAJMUDAR AND UMESH C. BANERJEE, JJ.] 
B-
Practice & Procedure-Delay & Laches-Land Acquisition-Writ 
petition challenging acquisition 21 years after notification and 16 years 
after passing of award and handing over of possession-Whether C 
maintainable-held, after award is passed no writ petition can be filed 
challenging acquisition-Discretionary Relief-Act or conduct should not 
indicate giving up of rights-Equity favours vigilant rather than an indolent 
litigant-Constitution of India-Article 226. 
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966-Section 126(4)-;- D 
Land Acquisition-Writ Petition challenging notification and award after 
considerable delay-Claim made before relevant authority-Execution of 
award filed during pendency of writ petition-Held, facts do not indicate any 
challenge to the notice of acquisition and suggests acceptance of award--
Land Acquisition act. 1984-Section 6. 
E 
Petitioners issued notification dated 15.5.1971 under Section 126(4) 
of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 read with Section 
6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1994 with regard to acquisition of land and 
award dated 26.4.1976 was passed thereunder and possession of land was 
taken from respondent Nos. 1to3. In the year 1992, respondent Nos. 1to3 
filed writ petition challenging the said notification and award which was F 
allowed by the High Court on the ground that petition must not necessarily 
be refused whenever there was delay and the plea of delay and laches should 
not be allowed to be raised during arguments without any pleading; and that 
appellants failed to take steps for the purpose for which land was acquired 
and modified the purpose which gave cause of action in favour of respondent G 
Nos. 1 to 3 and they were entitled to relief on the basis of equitable principle 
even if there was delay in filing the writ petition. Against the order of the 
High Court, appellants have filed the present appeal. 
The appellants contended that the High Court should have taken note of 
197 
H 
198 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 
A delay of21 years from the date of notification and 16 years from the date of 
Award and making over possession, in filing the writ petition. 
The respondents contended that the claim being time barred or the 
conduct being barred under the laws of limitation could not arise in the case 
of continuing wrong; and that the ma/a jides involved should not be restricted 
B to be challenged under the garb of limitation. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD : 1.1. While no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal 
course of events, the period the party is required for filing a civil proceeding 
C ought to be the guiding factor. The extraordinary jurisdiction has been 
conferred on to the law courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a 
very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, 'delay 
defects equity' has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under 
Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided 
D one has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity favours 
a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of 
law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as 
regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does 
not and cannot arise. (204-A-C) 
E 
1.2. While it is true that the plea of limitation ought to be raised at the 
first available opportunity but that does not mean and imply that the party 
raising it even during the course of hearing would be barred therefrom. 
Limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. The respondents did in fact 
agitate the point of limitation during the course of hearing and also had taken 
the plea in their affidavit in reply and prior to the commencement of the 
F 
hearing of the matter. The High Court was thus clearly in error in holding 
without any further factual detail that the cause of action for the challenge to 
the Notification under the Maharashtra Act of 1966 continues even on the 
date of filing of the writ petition. [202-A-C) 
G 
2.1. There are three owners of the land. Two owners of the land did' in 
fact put forward a claim in regard to the land value and structure before the 
concerned authority. The other owner however, did not put forth a

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