THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI & ORS. versus CENTURY TEXTILES AND INDUSTRIES LIMITED & ORS.
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 313 : 2025 INSC 36 The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Century Textiles and Industries Limited & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 6667 of 2023) 07 January 2025 [Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the appellant-Corporation was bound to convey the lease in favour of the respondent in terms of s.51 of the Bombay Improvement Trust Transfer Act, 1925; and whether writ petition filed before the High Court sufferred from delays and laches and was liable to be dismissed as the cause of action had arisen in 1955 whereas the writ petition was filed in 2016 after a delay of 61 (sixty-one) years. Headnotesβ Bombay Improvement Trust Transfer Act, 1925 β ss.48, 51Β β Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 β s.527 β City of the Bombay Improvement Act, 1898 β s.32B β Poorer Classes Accommodation Scheme-PCAS β Default and determination of lease β Execution of conveyance β In 1918, PCAS approved for respondent no. 1 which provided for construction of 44 Blocks of poorer class dwellings containing a total of 980 rooms and 20 shops as a pre-condition for execution lease u/s.32GΒ β Scheme duly notified β Respondent no. 1 constructed 476 dwellings and 10 shops till 1925, as a part of the pre-condition for execution of lease β 1898 Act repealed by the Act of 1925Β β Respondent no.1 applied to the Improvement Trust under the 1925 Act for alteration of the notified Scheme and the same was granted β According to the resolution, Block-B and Block-C was to be excluded β Block-B was conveyed to the respondent no.1 β Lease of Block-A for a period of 28 years granted to the company, which was to expire in 1955 β For 51 years, neither the appellant nor respondent no.1 initiated any proceedings against each other β In 2006, respondent No.1 served notice u/s.527 of the 1888 Act on the *βAuthor 314 [2025] 1 S.C.R. Digital Supreme Court Reports appellant that after expiry of lease period of 28 years, the said property ought to be conveyed to the respondent No.1 and, on failure to do so the respondent No.1 would be constrained to file a suit β However, no suit ever filed β Respondent no.1 requested to execute formal deed of conveyance in 2014 and 2016, however, no action taken β Respondent No.1 then filed writ petition in 2016 β High Court allowed the same directing the appellant to execute formal conveyance of plot in favour of the respondent No.1 β Sustainability: Held : Not sustainable β Terms and conditions of the lease agreement reveal no stipulation that on the expiry of the lease, after completion of 28 years, the appellants would be bound to convey the said land to respondent no.1 β Neither the Board Resolution nor the lease deed and neither the statutory framework in force imposed any obligation upon the appellant to execute a conveyance in favour of the respondent no.1 β High Court misinterpreted the same to be a condition incorporated in the lease deed for conveyance, on expiration of 28 years β Harmonious and contextual interpretation of ss.48(a) and 51(2) of the 1925 Act, as well as the clear absence of any covenant to that effect in the lease deed, unequivocally demonstrates that no vested right to conveyance arose on the expiration of the lease β Rather than insisting that βshall conveyβ in s.51(2) invariably means an unconditional obligation, it is more appropriate to understand that it calls for conveyance only where the arrangement and compliance align with the statutory prerequisitesΒ β Absent any express statutory mandate or contractual stipulation, the claim for compulsory conveyance at the end of the lease term must fail β Respondent no.1 failed to take any active step in furtherance of getting such a conveyance executed at the end of the lease term β Thus, the appellants neither bound nor were under any legal obligations to convey the premises to the respondent no.1 β As regards delay and laches, no merit in the conduct of the respondent no. 1 where it deliberately chose to sit still on its rights for a long period of fifty-one years β Writ petition filed before the High Court in 2016 clearly a route adopted to subvert the long delay of sixty-one years which cannot be condonable β View taken by the High Court in treating the petition to be not suffering from any delay and laches cannot be sustained β Furthermore, the preamble to the 1925 Act states that enactment was for constructing new [202
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