THE JUMMA MASJID, MERCARA versus KODIMANIANDRA DE\'IAH

Citation: [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 554 · Decided: 11-01-1962 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

lN2 
!i«rdar s,.'"4 
T• Soifa"1i• 
SdH 
T, 
·no, Stai. of Biid., 
1962 
Jonu"'JI IJ. 
554 
SUPREME COURT REPORT8 [I!lti2J SUPP. 
guarantee under Art. 2.i (I) and rcnderini: thll 
protection illusory. 
Jn my view th" petitio1vr iH entitled to the 
relief that he seeks and the petition will accordingly 
be allowed. 
}fr Conn : In Ae<·ordaiwe with the majority 
view of this Court, the vetition is allowed. The 
petitioner is entitled to his costs. 
Petition all<JWed. 
---
THE JOMMA MASJID, .MERCARA 
v. 
KODIMANIANDRA DE\'IAH 
(J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYA.TULJ,AH, J. C. SHAH and 
T. L. VENKA1'ARA.:l!A AJYAH, JJ.) 
Tran"fer of Proptrty-Sa/e by ret-ersioner for co11airkration 
-Fra"Udu/,e.nt or errc>nt:ou.9 
repre.lienlati()tz--f'rr.~1 nt transferable 
int1.re~t, tl1ou9h in/act sprs ,'."ucce~,~inni.t .. S11bRr.quenl- acquiaition 
of title-Ejfect-Rult of "''"N><i-11'1.tn lcr uc resort'd to Transfer 
of Property Act, 
18$2(4 of 18821, •· 6(a). 
Intuprtlalion of 
Statute-( 'onsiruing of aertion-1/ nP111 rrvrda wuld be read 1"nto 
it-11/u.atration to a section 
When 
rou/d be ustd lo enlarge the 
language-If admissiilt ,,, construi1ig a section. 
M and S claiming t0 be revenioners to the estate of N 
sold the property in dispute to G predecessor-in-interest of the 
re.pondents. The sale dred recited that the property belongcrl 
to the joint family of two brothers N and B, and on the death 
of N it was inherited by his 
widow and on her death it had 
devolved upon them as 
reversioners· to the stato. G sued to 
recover possession of the propcrties. The suit was contested 
by the wiclow of B(brother of N) claiming that the property 
was the self acquired pn·pcrty of her hushand. During the 
pendency of the litiFatio·' the widow died, and G applied to 
the revenue authoritin to transfer the 'pattas' in his name. 
The appellants intervened alleging that the property was gifted 
to them by the widow, and S one of the reversioners had also 
executed a 
release of the said property for a consideration. 
This objection was rejected. The appellants then sued for 
posac!Sion of a half share in the properties held by the widow 
of B, relying upon the gift by the widow, and the deed of 
surrender by S one of the two reversioners to the estate of N. 
They contended that the Vendors of the property to G had 
2 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
555 
only a spe.• succcssionis during the life time of the widow of B, 
and the transfer was on that 
account void 
and conferred no 
title. The heirs of G contended that the property was sold to 
G by M and S on a 
rep1esentation 
that the Vendor had 
become entitled 
thereto, and the appellants as transferees 
from S were <Stopped 
from 
asserting that it was in fact the 
self.acquisition of B and that in ron.•equence he had no title at 
the date of the sale. 
Held, that where a ptrson transfers property representiug 
that he has a present interest therein, whereas he has, in fact, 
only a spes successfuru'a, the transferee is entitled to the benefit 
of s. 43 of lhe Transfrr of Property Act, 1882, if he has taken 
the transfer for consideration and 
on 
the 
faith of the 
represen ta ti on. 
Htld, further, that apart from the exc~ption in favour 
of transferees for 
consideration in 
good faith and without 
notice of the rights under 
the 
prior transfer s. 43 of the 
Transfer of Property Act is absolute and unqualified in its 
operation. It applies to all transfrrs which fulfil the conditions 
prescribed therein, and it makes no difference in its application 
whether the defect of title in the transferor arises by reason of 
his having no interest in 
the property, or of his interest 
therein being that of an expectant heir. 
The section deals 
with transfers which fail for want of title in the transferor 
and not lvant of capacity in him at the time of transfer. 
It 
embodies a nile of estoppel and enacts that a person who 
makes a 
representation shall not 
be heard to allege the 
contrary as against a 'person who acts on the representation. 
It is immaterial whether the transferor acts bona fide or 
fraudulently in making the representation. 
It i; only material 
to find out whether in fact the transferee has been misled. In 
view of the sprcific provision of'· 43 the principle of c8toppel 
against a statute does not apply to transfers prohibited by 
s. 6 (a) of the Act. The two provisions operate in different 
fields and under different 
conditions. There is no necessary 
conflict between them, and the

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