THE GUJARAT AGRO INDUSTRIES CO. LTD versus THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF AHMEDABAD AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

Citation: [1999] 2 S.C.R. 895 · Decided: 26-04-1999 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.P. WADHWA · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

-
THE GUJARAT AGRO INDUSTRIES CO. LTD. 
A 
v. 
THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF 
THE CITY OF AJ-IMEDABAD AND ORS. ETC. ETC. 
APRIL 26, 1999 
B 
[D.P. WADHWA AND N. SANTOSH HEGDE, JJ.] 
Bombay ProvinCial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949-Section 406 
(J!J, 2(c), (e) (Proviso), 408 (1) as applicable to Ahmedabad-Appeal against 
demand of property tax-Pre-condition to deposit amount of disputed tax or C 
chargeable tax on the basis of disputed rateable value-Exemption could be 
granted up to 25% of the amount required to be deposited at the discretion 
of the Judge-Constitutional validity challenged-Upheld by High Court-
on appeal Held, right to appeal being statutory right, it is for the legislature 
to decide whether to make it subjecf to any condition or not-Provision for D 
appeal under clause (e) is a kind of second appeal apart from other effective 
remedie$ available-Pre-condition for making deposit and provision for 
exemption not beyond25% are constitutionally valid-Constitution of Jndia-
Artic/e 14. 
The appellants own certain properties regarding which demand notices E 
for payment of property tax were issued. They challenged the assessments 
in appeals under. Section 406 (1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal 
Corporations Act, 1949 as applicable to Ahmedabad. The Act provides that 
the amount of disputed tax or chargeable tax on the basis of the disputed 
rateable value shall have to be d~posited before hearing of an appeal. In view 
of Section 406(2) (e) (Proviso) of the Act, a Judge cannot grant exemption F 
from payment of property tax .for more than 25% of the amount demanded 
during pendency ofan appeal. The constitutional validity of this clause was 
cha.llenged before the High Court as being violative of Article· 14 of the 
Constitution. The High Court held the clause to be constitutionally valid. 
Hence these appeals. 
G 
Dismissing the appeal, this Court 
HELD : 1. Right to appeal is a creature of a statute and it is for the 
legislature to decide whether the right of appeal should be unconditionally 
given to an aggrieved party or it should be conditionally give11. It cannot be H 
895 
896 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1999] '2 S.C.R. 
A said that such a law would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. If~ 
the statute does not create any right of appeal, no appeal can be filed. There 
is a clear distinction between a suit and an appeal. Every person has an 
inherent right to bring a suit of a civil nature unless the suit is barred by 
statute. However, in regard to an appeal, the position is quite opposite. Tht~ 
B right to appeal inheres in no one and, therefore, for maiutainability of an 
appeal there must be authority of law. When such a law authorises filing of 
appeal, it can impose conditions as well. (902-B-C) 
Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Others, (1975) 2 SCC 1'46; 
Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar & Ors., [1974) 4 SCC 393; Shyam Kishore 
C & Ors, v. Municipql Corporation of Delhi & Anr., [1993) 1 SCC 22 and Vijay 
Prakash D. Mehta/Shri Jawahar D. Mehta v. Collector of Customs 
(Preventive) Bombay, [19S8) 4 SCC 402, relied on. 
Mis Elora Construction Company v. Municipal Corporation of Greater 
Bombay & Ors., AIR (1980) Born. 162 and Chhatter Singh Baid & Ors. v. 
D Corporation of Calcutta & Ors., AIR (1984) Cal. 283, referred to. 
2. Under Section 406 (2) (c) a complaint lies to the Municipal 
Commissioner against imposition· of any property tax and only after that 
when the complaint is disposed of that appeal can be filed. Appeal to the Court 
E as provided in clause (e) appears to be rather a second appeal. Then under 
Section 408 of the Act provisions exist for referring the matter to arbitration. 
Under Section 408(1) where any person aggrieved by any order fixing or 
charging any rateable value or tax under the Act desires that any matter in 
difference between him and the other parties interested in such order should 
be referred to arbitration, then, if all such parties agree to do so, they may 
F apply to the Court for an order of reference on such matter and when such 
an order is made provisions relating to arbitration in suits shall apply. That 
apart, if a person cannot avail of the right of appeal under Section 406 of 
the Act, other remedies are available to him under the law. (904-D-FJ 
G 
3. There is no difficulty in upholding the vires of Section 406 (2) (e) 
(proviso) and any challenge to its constitutional validity on the ground that 
onerous conditions hav

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.