THE DIRECTOR, MINISTRY OF COAL AND ORS. versus BIMLENDU KUMAR

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R. 24 · Decided: 28-10-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
THE DIRECTOR, MINISTRY OF COAL AND ORS. 
B 
c 
v. 
BIMLENDU KUMAR 
OCTOBER 28, 1996 
(K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANA!K, JJ.] 
Service Law : 
Coal Mines Provident Fund (Employees Recruitment) Rules,1982: 
Rule ?-Termination of service-Probation not extended beyond three 
years-Held: there was no express order of confirmation of probation and 
substantive appointment-Must therefore be deemed that after expiry of 
three years he remained to be a probationer-Satisfactory completion of 
probation and declaration of probation are two conditions precedent to 
D eventual substantive appointment to the post in which he was recruited 
and appointed on probation-Direction regarding payment of compensation 
also not correct. 
E 
Om Prakash Maurya v. UP. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation, 
Lucknow and Ors., (1986] Supp. SCC 95, held inapplicable. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. I 4580 of 
1996. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.11.94 of the Patna High 
F Court in C.W.J.C. No.I II I of 1989(R) 
P.P. Malhotra, Ms. Indira Sawhney, Deepak Dewan and Arvind K. 
Sharma for the Appellants. 
G 
Brej K. Mishra and Ejaz Maqbool for the Respondent. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered: 
Leave granted. 
H 
We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 
24 
•• 
DIRECTOR, MIN. OF COAL v. BIMLENDU KR. 
25 
This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Division A 
Bench of the Patna High Court made on 24.11.1994 in LPA No.35/91 and 
the order of the learned single Judge made on 26.2.1991 in CWJC No.1111/ 
89. 
The admitted position is that the respondent was appointed on 
probation to a temporary post under Ruic 7( 1) of the Coal Mines Provident B 
Fund (Employees Recruitment) Rules, 1982 (for short, the 'Rules'). His 
appointment was terminated on May 14, 1989 which was challenged by 
contending that since his probation was not extended beyond three years 
under Rule 7(6) of the Rules, the order of termination is bad in law. The 
learned single Judge has held that he is a temporary appointee; therefore, 
his termination is bad in law. He is accordingly entitled to the payment of C 
the salary for the period of three years and three months. On appeal, the 
Division Bench set aside the order of the learned single Judge and held 
that the respondent should be deemed to have been confirmed and directed 
payment of the wages amounting to six years salary. Thus, this appeal by 
special leave. 
D 
The question is: whether the view taken by the Division Bench and 
the learned single Judge is correct in Law? Rule 7( 1) contemplates that the 
person appointed to a post by directed recruitment, with a view to his 
eventual substantive appointment to that post, shall be on probation for a 
period of two years. For an eventual substantive appointments, on successful 
completion of pr~bation, Rule 7(6) contemplates thus: 
E 
"(6) the appointing authority may in suitable case extend the 
period of probation by not more than one year, but no person 
shall in any case by kept on probation for a total period exceeding 
three years in any post. In the case of extension of probationary 
period the employee shall be informed of his short coming well F 
in advance to enable him to make special efforts for 
improvement." 
Sub-rule (7) of Rule 7 speaks of confirmation of the probationer 
after completion of the period of probation. It envisages thus: 
G 
"(7) Confirmation of a probationer after completion of the period 
of probation shall not be automatic. As long as no specific order 
of confirmation or satisfactory completion of probation is issued 
to a probationer such probationer shall be deemed to have 
continued on probation notwithstanding sub-rule (6)." 
H 
26 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 8 s.c.R» 
A 
A conjoint reading of Rule 7(1 ), 7(6) and 7(7) would show that 
Rule 7(6) is subject to the operation of Rule 7(1). It is, no doubt, true, as 
contended by Mr. P.P. Malhotra, learned senior counsel for the appellants, 
that after the expiry of the period of two years, the appellant has power to 
extend the period of probation for more than three years to enable the 
probationer to improve his efficiency in the service so that he could improve 
B his efficiency as may be pointed out, and improve his quality of service 
for confirmation. However, in view of the language in subrule (7) of Rule 
7, the operation of Rule 7(6) is subject to the confirmation on satisfactory 
completion of the probation. In this

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