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THE DARGAH COMMITTEE, AJMER versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Citation: [1962] 2 S.C.R. 265 · Decided: 24-04-1961 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
265 
to murder even although this completed act would 
not, unless followed by the other acts, result in kil-
ling. It might be the beginning of the attempt, but 
would nonetheless be an attempt". 
This supports our view. 
We therefore hold that the conviction of the 
appellant under s. 307, Indian Penal Code, is correct 
and accordingly dismiss this appeal. 
Appeal dismissed. 
THE DARGAH COMMITTEE, AJMER 
v. 
STATE OF RAJASTHAN 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, 
K. C. DAS GUPTA and 
T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.) 
Municipality-Costs incurred for repairs realisable by Commit-
tee as tax-Magistrate entertaining application-If an inferior 
criminal court-Ajmer-Merwara Municipalities Regulation, r925 
(Regulation VI of r925), ss. 222(4), 234. 
On the failure of the appellant to carry out the requisition 
by the Municipality to execute certain repairs to its property the 
Municipality carried out the said repairs after giving due notice, 
the cost of which became recoverable from the appellant as tax 
under s. 222(4) of the Ajmer Merwara Municipalities Regulation. 
The Municipality applied under s. 234 of the Regulation to the 
Additional Tehsildar and Magistrate, II Class, Ajmer for the 
recovery of the amount of cost incurred by them, and the 
magistrate passed an order calling upon the appellant to pay the 
dues. 
Against this order the appellant preferred a criminal 
revision application in the court of Sessions Judge which was 
rejected as there was no ground to interfere in revision. 
The 
appellant then moved the High Court in its revisional jurisdic-
tion wherein the respondents raised preliminary objection that 
the criminal revision application filed by the appellant was 
incompetent since the Magistrate who entertained respondent 
No. 2 Municipal Committee's application under s. 234 was not 
an inferior criminal court under s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure 
Om Parkas!I 
v. 
State of PuHj11.b 
Raghubar 
Dayal j. 
April a~. 
266 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1962) 
z96I 
Code, the said objection was upheld and the criminal revision 
application dismissed on that ground. 
c 
D:irgah A. 
The question was whether the Magistrate who entertained 
ommi '" 
;mer the application made before him by the Municipality under 
St 1 of~ . th 
s. 234 of the Regulation was an inferior criminal court under 
a • 
ayas ans. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and also whether an 
application under s. 234 could be made unless the rules were 
framed and the forms of the notice for making a demand under 
s. 222 were prescribed. 
Held, that the Proceedings initiated before a Magistrate 
under s. 234 of the Ajmer Merwara Municipalities Regulation 
were merely in the nature of recovery proceedings and no other 
questions could be raised in the said proceedings. The nature 
of the enquiry contemplated bys. 234 was very limited; it prima 
facie partook of the character of a ministerial enquiry rather 
than judicial enquiry and at the best could be treated as a pro-
ceeding of a civil nature but not a criminal proceeding and the 
Magistrate who entertained the application was not an inferior 
criminal court. 
Whatever may be the character of the proceedings, whe-
ther it was purely ministerial or judicial or quasi-judicial, the 
Magistrate who entertained the application and held the enquiry 
did so because he was designated in that behalf and so he must 
be treated as a persona designata and not as a Magistrate func-
tioning and exercising his authority under the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. He could not therefore be regarded as an inferior 
criminal court. 
Held, further, that if the rules were not prescribed as requir-
ed bys. 234 of the Regulation then all that could be said was 
that there was no form prescribed for issuing a demand notice, 
that did not mean that the statutory power conferred on the 
committee bys. 222(1) to make a demand was unenforceable 
and an amount which was claimable by virtue of s. 222(1) did 
not cease to be claimable just because rules had not been fram-
ed prescribing the form for making the said demand. 
Crown through Municipal Committee, Ajmer v. Amba Lal, 
Ajmer-Merwara Law Journal, Vol. V, 92, Re Dinbai Jijibhai 
Khambatta, (1919) I.L.R. 43 Born. 864, V. B. D'Monte v. Band1a 
Borough Municipality, I.L.R. 1950 Born. 522, Emperor v. Devappa 
Ramappa, (1918) 43 Born. 607, Re Dalsukhram Hurgovandas, 
(1907) 6 Cr. L. J. 425 and Municipal Committee, Lashkar v. Shah-
buddin, A

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