THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NAGPUR versus ITS EMPLOYEES

Citation: [1960] 2 S.C.R. 942 · Decided: 10-02-1960 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

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I960 
942 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)] 
"terminal charges" means "for the provision of" 
and not" for the user of". 
S. S. Light 
Railway Co. Ltd. 
The necessary conclusion that follows is that 
v. 
irrespective of the fact of the actual user by any 
Upper Doob Sugar particular consignor of the stations sidings and other 
Mills Ltd. 
things mentioned in s. 3(14) "term'inal charges" are 
Das Gupta 1. 
leviable by reason of the mere fact that these 'things 
have been provided by the Railway Administration. 
The conclusion that necessarily follows therefrom is 
that the charges of Rs. 4·11 at either end sought to 
be levied by the Railway Administration in addition 
to the charges for carriage was " terminal charges" 
within the meaning of the Railways Act and the pro-
posed levy being in accordance with Government 
Notification under s. 32 of the 
0Act was nothing more 
than the application of standardized terminal charges. 
The Tribunal had therefore no jurisdiction to investi-
gate the reasonableness or otherwise of the same and 
had no jurisdiction to reduce the same. The order 
made by the majority of the Tribunal cannot there-
fore be allowed to stand. 
Februa,ry. IO 
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The order made by the Tribunal is therefore set 
aside. The application made under s. 41 in respect 
of this levy of Rs. 9·6 per 4 wheeler truck in addition 
to the carriage is rejected. The appeal is allowed 
with costs. 
Appeal allowed. 
THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF 
NAGPUR 
v. 
ITS EMPLOYEES 
(P. I3. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND 
K.C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) 
Industrial Dispute-Services undertaken by City Corporation-If 
and when industry-Test-'Inditstry'. Meaning of--Central Pro-
vinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, r947 (C.P. & 
Berar XXIII of r947). s. 2 (r4)-City of Nagpur Corporation Act. 
r948 (Madhya Pradesh 2 of Ig50). 
The question for determination in these appeals was whether 
and to what extent the municipal activities of the Corporation of 
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S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
943 
Nagpur City fell within the term 'industry' as defined bys. 2 (14) 
z960 
of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947· 
Disputes having arisen between the said Corporation and its 
February ro 
employees in its various departments, ·the State Government 
referred them for adjudication to the State Industrial Court 
under s. 39 of the Act and that Court by its award held that the 
Corporation and all its departments were covered by the said 
definition. Against that award the Corporation made an applica-
tion to the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The 
High Court rejected its contention that the Corporation was not 
an industry within the meaning of the said section and remanded 
the case to the Industrial Court for determination as to which of 
its departments fell within the definition and making an award 
accordingly. Thereafter The Industrial Court found all the 
departments of the Corporation except those dealing with 
(1) assessment and le'1y of house-tax (2) assessment and levy of 
Octroi, (3) removal of encroachment and removal and pulling 
down of dilapidated houses, (4) prevention and control of food , 
adulteration, and (S) maintenance of cattle pounds, to be indus-
tries within the meaning of the definition and passed its award 
accordingly. The Corporation appealed to this Court by special 
leave, but there was no appeal on behalf of the employees of the 
five departments excluded from the definition. , 
Held, that the decision of the Industrial Court except so far 
as it related to the five departments in respect of which there 
was no appeal, must be affirmed. 
The definition of the word 'industry' in s. 2 (14) of the C.P. 
and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947, although in 
a language somewhat different from that of s. 2 (j) of the Industrial 
Disputes Act, 1947, is very comprehensive. It is in two parts, 
cl. (a) defines it from the standpoint of employers and cl. (b) 
from that of the employee. An activity that falls within any of 
the two clauses must be an industry. 
D.N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee [1953] S.C.R. 302 and Baroda 
Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen. [1957] S.C.R. 33, applied. 
It is not necessary that an activity of the Corporation must 
share the common characteristics of an industry before it can 
come within the section. 
The words of s. 2 (14) of the Act are 
clear and unambiguous ,and the maxim noscitur a socii can have 
no application. · T
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