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THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY versus THE ELPHINSTONE SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS LTD.

Citation: [1960] 3 S.C.R. 953 · Decided: 04-05-1960 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.K. DAS · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

---'\ 
3 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
953 
fail. If the gift is invalid, the petition must fail on 
the ground that the Act has not affected the petition-
ers' rights in any lands held by them. 
We would, 
therefore, dismiss that petition with costs except the 
costs of the hearing before us for all the three peti-
tions were heard together. 
Lastly, we come to Petition No. 41 of 1956. This 
petition must clearly be dismissed. It was filed by 
the son of the petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955 
claiming to be entitled to the sthanam lands situate 
in an area which was formerly Pi1'rt of the Cochin 
State. It is not in dispute that the impugned Act 
was never extended to that area. Therefore, whether 
the gift to him was valid or not, as to which we say 
nothing, the petitioner in this petition is not affected 
by that Act at all. His petition is clearly misconceiv-
ed. His petition is, therefore, dismissed and he will 
pay the costs excepting the costs of the hearing. 
ORDER OF COURT. 
In view of the judgment of the majority, Petition 
No. 443 of 1955, is allowed with costs, Petition No. 40 
of 1956, is allowed without costs, and Petition No. 41 
of 1956, is dismissed without costs. 
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, 
BOMBAY 
v. 
THE ELPHINSTONE SPINNING AND 
WEAVING MILLS LTD. 
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.) 
Income-tax-Assessee incurring loss but paying dividends-
Additional income-tax, liability 
to pay-Construction of taxing 
statute-Income-tax Act, I922 (XI of I922), s. 3-Finance Act, 
I9SI (23 of I9SI), First Schedule, Paragraph B. 
The assessee had made profits during the assessment year 
1951-52 but after deduction of the depreciation allowance it was 
found to have incurred a loss for income-tax purposes. In the 
same year the assessee declared dividends. The Income-tax 
Officer treated this amount as ' excess dividend ' and levied 
additional income-tax as provided in paragraph B of Part I of 
the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 195L The assessee 
contended that inasmuch as there was no income at all which wa~ 
19~0 
K avalappata 
Kottarathil 
Kochuni 
v. 
State of Madras 
Sarkar }. 
May 4, 
954 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[l9fjUj 
Iy6o 
taxable the words "on the total income" in pa.ragraph B did 
not apply to it and no additional income-tax could be levied. 
co1nniissironer of ~fhe appellant, relying on the proviso to paragraph B, contended 
Jncorne Ta~. 
that additional income-tax was imposed on excess dividend andยท 
Bombay 
if excess dividend was paid out, the liability to tax arose: 
v. 
Held, that the assessee was notliable to pay additional income-
Etphinstone 
tax. The liability to tax was imposed by s. 3 of,the Income-tax 
'P'""'i!Jยฅ/'"i d Act and the Finance Act merely laid down the rates at which tax 
Weaving 
tl s 
1 ยทwas to be levied on the total income. If there was no income there 
was no question of applying a rate to the "total income" and no 
income-tax or super-tax could possibly result. 
The word 
"additional" in the expression "additional income-tax" implied 
that there was a tax before. The expressions "charge on the 
total income " and "profits liable to tax " in paragraph B con-
templated only those cases where there was income and not 
cases where there was loss. 
Consequently the expression "divi-
dends payable out of such profits" could only apply when there 
were profits and not.when there were no profits. The imposition of 
additional income-tax was conditioned by the existence.of income 
and profits. The legislature used language appropriate to income 
and applied the rate to the "total income". Where there was 
no total income the law could not apply and the courts could not 
be asked to supply the omission made by the legislature or to 
delete or to modify any words. If the words of a taxing statute 
failed then so did the tax. The courts could not, except rarely 
and in clear cases, help the draftsman by a favourable construc-
tion. 
Curtis v. Stovin, (r889) 22 Q.B. 5r3, Commissioner of Income-
tax v. Teja Singh, [r959] 35 I.T.R. 408 S.C., Whitney v. Commis-
sioners of Inland Revenue, (r925) IO T.C. 88, special Commissioners 
of Income Tax v. Linsleys, Ltd., (r958) 37 T.C. 677 and Com-
missioners of Inland Revenue v. South Georgia Co. Ltd. (r958) 37 
T.C. 725, distinguished. 
The Cape Brandy Syndicate v. The Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, (r920) r2 T.C. 358 and Wolfson v. Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, (r949) 3r T.C. r4r, referred to. 
The pr

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