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THE COMMISSIONER, CORPORATION OF CHENNAI versus R. SIVASANKARA MEHTA AND ANOTHER

Citation: [2011] 5 S.C.R. 243 · Decided: 13-04-2011 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.K. GANGULY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2011] 5 S.C.R. 243 
THE COMMISSIONER, CORPORATION OF CHENNAI 
v. 
R. SIVASANKARA MEHTA AND ANOTHER 
(Civil Appeal No(s). 5740-5741 of 2005) 
APRIL 13, 2011 
[ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY AND 
SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.] 
LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894: 
s.48, and s.48-8 (as inserted by Land Acquisition (Tamil 
Nadu Amendment) Act, 1996 - Release of acquired land -
A 
B 
c 
Land acquired in 1949 and transferred to Municipal 
Corporation -
Government, by order dated 19.3.1995, 
directing reconveyance of a portion of the land to land-owners 
0 
- However, subsequently, by order dated 25. 7. 1995, the order 
dated 10. 3. 1995 cancelled -
Writ petition of land owners 
allowed by High Court -
HELD: When the order of re-
conveyance was made on 10.3.1995, s.48 of the Act was 
holding the field - Under the provisions of s.48 the land-
owners had no right of asking for re-conveyance in ยท 1995 as 
E . 
the possession had been taken in 1949 and land vested in 
Government in 1962 - Further, the Government divested itself 
by giving the land over to the Corporation - So, exercise of 
power by Government in cancelling the previous 
reconveyance cannot be faulted. -
Section 48-8 is not F 
retrospective in operation - Even before making release of 
land uls 48-8, Government must be satisfied that the land is 
not required for any public purpose - Corporation needs the 
land for parking space, which is certainly a public purpose -
In view of clear provisions of s.48, there is no question of G 
promissory estoppel which is an equitable doctrine and has 
no application to the facts of the case - Promissory estoppel 
- Equity. 
243 
H 
-ยท 
244 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2011) 5 S.C.R 
A 
Lands of the respondents were acquired pursuant 
to notification dated 3.1.1949 issued under the Land 
Acquisition Act, 1894. On getting the enhanced 
compensation in reference proceedings, the land owners 
did not take the matter further. The lands acquired vested 
B in the State u/s 16 in 1962. In 1995 the respondents made 
a representation for release/reconveyance of a portion 
of the land, inter alia, on the ground that the appellant-
Corporation was not utilising the same. The Government 
by its order dated 10-3-1995 directed the Corporation to 
c reconvey a portion of the lands admeasuring 5 grounds 
and 416 sq. ft. to the land owners or their legal heirs or 
nominees under ex-owner category. The Corporation 
made a representation to the Government for utilization 
of the said land as parking space. Accordingly, the 
0 Government by order dated 25-7-1995 cancelled the order 
of reconveyance passed on 10-3-1995. The writ petitions 
filed by the respondents challenging the order were 
allowed by the Single Judge of the High Court. The 
Division Branch of the High Court referred to the 
provisions of s.48-8 which was introduced by the Land 
E Acquisition (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act 1996, and 
declined to interfere. Aggrieved, the Corporation filed the 
appeals. 
F 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 Admittedly, s. 48-B came on the statute 
book in 1997 by the Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu 
Amendment) Act, 1996 (being Act 16of1997). The assent 
of the President to the said Act was received on 14.3.1997. 
G On perusal of s. 48-8, it is clear that the same is not 
retrospective in operation. The said provision, which is 
a departure from s. 48 can apply only prospectively. [para 
7 and 8) [249-F-G; 250-B] 
H 
Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. Keeravani Ammal and 
COMMNR., CORPORATION OF CHENNAI v. R. 
245 
SIVASANKARA MEHTA 
Ors., 2007 (3) SCR 1062 =AIR 2007 SC 1691 - referred 
A 
to. 
ยท 
1.2 Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was 
holding the field when re-conveyance was purportedly 
ordered by the State Government by its order dated 10-
B 
3-1995. Under the provisions of s. 48 of the principal Act, 
the respondent(s) had no right of asking for re-
conveyance in 1995 in as much as it was the admitted 
case of the parties that possession of the property had 
been taken over by the State as early as in 1949 when c 
the Award was passed and the land vested in the State 
Government in 1962. Thereafter it was transferred to the 
Corporation. This aspect of the case, which goes to the 
root of the question, was totally missed by the High 
Court. (para 11-12] (250-E; 251-C-D] 
o 
1.3 Even assuming, that s. 48-B was available in 1995 
when re-conveyance was ordered, even then the 
respondent(s) has no case. In a recent judgment 
rendered by this Court in L. Chandrase.kar

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