THE COMMISSIONER, AGRA AND ORS. versus ROHTAS SINGH AND ORS.

Citation: [1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 317 · Decided: 09-12-1997 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SUJATA V. MANOHAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

THE COMMISSIONER, AGRA AND ORS. 
A 
v. 
ROHTAS SINGH AND ORS. 
DECEMBER 9, 1997 
[SUJATA V. MANOHAR AND G.T. NANAVATI, .JJ.] 
B 
Contempt of Cowts Act, 1971: Sections 2(b), (c) and 15. 
Contempt of court-Commissio11 of-By Govemmenl officials-Ap-
peara11ce of Law Officers lo def end Govemment officials against whom C 
11otices for contempt of cowt were issued for disobedience of order of 
Cowt-Authorisation of-field : State Govemment can autho1ise any of its 
Law Officers to appear and defe11d such Govemment Officials--High Court 
11ot justified in stiiking down Govemment Order which provided for a pa11el 
of Advocates for defending Government Officials in 
contempt peti- D 
tions-High Court cannot also give general directions that the litigation expen-
ses in contempt proceedings would be bome not by the Govemment but by 
the Govemment Officials-Howeve1; in ce1tai11 situations Advocate General 
may decline to appear for an alleged comem11er who is a Govemment 
Official-Wl1ere the conduct of the Govemme11t official is contzunaciow; the 
cowt ca11 direct him to pay costs perso11ally-Allahabad High Cowt Rules, . E 
1952-R.. 6----<:onstitzttiOn of bzdia, 1950-Articles 129 a11d 215--Legal 
Remembrancer's Manual, 1975. 
Co11tempt of cowt-Proceedings f01---Nature of-field : Contempt 
proceedings cannot be equated with prosecutio11 of ciiminals-Co111empt F 
proceedings are essentially a matter between cowt and colltemnors. 
In the Alll!habad High Court, Advocates for the State appearing in 
criminal matters are tlesignated as Government Advocates while advocates 
on behalf of the State appe~ring i11 civil matters are designated as Stand-
ing Counsel. The Allahabad High Court in its impugned order had held G 
that neither category of Advocates could appear in civil and criminal 
contempt proceedings on behalf of an alleged contemnor who was an 
ollicial of the State Government. It further held that no monetary help 
from the State Exchequer could be extended to such Government ollicials 
towards litigation expen~es in contempt proceedings. These expenses ~ere H 
317 
318 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 
A to be incurred personally by the Government officials concerned, which 
could be subsequently reimbursed to them if they were honourably ex-
onerated in contempt proceedings. The High Court had also struck down 
a Government Order dated 12.9.1996 issued by the Special Secretary and 
Additional Legal Remembrancer, Government of U.P. under which a panel 
B of Advocates had been nominated for appearance in cont.empt petitions 
filed against the Government of U.P. and its ollicers and/or employees. The 
High Court had struck down the names of Additional Chief Standing 
Counsel from both these panels. It had also held as of no consequence, the 
relevant provisions in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual, 1975 permitt!ng 
c 
D 
E 
Government Advocates and/or Standing Counsel to appear in such mat-
ters. Hence this appeal. 
Allowing the appeals, this Court 
HELD : 1. It was on account of the mistaken notion that the State 
had to prosecute an action for contempt of Court against the contemnor 
that the High Court, in the present case, came to the conclusion that the 
Advocates appointed by the State to represent it in Courts of law cannot 
appear for an officer of the State who is charged with contempt. This 
foundation of the High Court's reasoning is not sound. A contempt 
proceeding is often described as a 11uasi-criminal proceeding because it 
results in punishment for the contemnor. The proceeding, however, cannot 
be equated with the prosecution of a criminal by the State.· Contempt 
proceedings are essentially a matter between the court and the contemn or. 
Contempt jurisdiction enables the court to ensure proper administration 
F 
of justice and maintenance of the Rule of Law. It is meant to ensure that 
the courts are able to discharge their functions properly, unhampered and 
unsullied by wanton attacks on the system of administration of justice or 
on officials who administer it, and to prevent wilful defiance of' orders of 
the court or undertakings given to the Court. That is why the Supreme 
Court and the High Courts have an inherent power to punish for contempt 
G even deho1:~ legislation pertaining to contempt of Court. This is apparent 
also from the definition of "contempt" under the Contempt of Courts Act, 
1971. From this definition it is clear that the Courts' power to punish for 
contempt is a power wh

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