LexTHE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. versus THEIR WORKMEN
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- 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 157 THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. v. THEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,' A. K. SARKAR AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Industrial, Dispute-Award-Notice of Termination-Whether can be given by minority union-Industrial, Disputes Act, I947, (I4 of I947), ss.'I8, I9(6). - The appellant's workmen were represented by a Union called Kamdar Mandal Cement Works, Porbandar. The registration of the said union was cancelled and that led to the formation of two Unions, the Cement Kamdar Mandal and Cement Employees Union. The Cement Kamdar Mandal gave two notices one after another to the appellant, purporting to terminate two previous awards, wherein the defunct union represented the workmen. Thereafter the Mandal presented fresh demands and the dispute was referred to the Tribunal. The second union, the Cement Employees' Union which represented the majority of the appel- lant's workmen at Porbandar had been impleaded in the proceed- ings. The appellant raised preliminary objections before the Tribu- nal against the competency of the reference inter alia on the ground that the award in question by which the parties were bound had not been duly terminated under s. r9(6) of the Act in as much as the union which purported to terminate the said award represented only a minority of workmen bound by it. The Tribunal by its interlocutary judgment found against the appel- lant. The dispute between the parties centres round the question as to who can issue the notice terminating the award on behalf of workmen who are bound by the award as a result of s. rS of the Act. The question therefore for decision is whether a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen governed by an award can give notice. to the other party intimating its intention to terminate the award under s. r9(6) of the Industrial Disputes ~tr~~ . Held, that the effect of s. rS is that an award properly made by an industrial tribunal governs the employer and all those who represent him under s. rS(c) and the employees who are parties to the dispute and all those who are included ins. rS(b) and (d). On a fair and reasonable reading of s. r9(6), the true position is that, though the expression "any party bound by the award" refers to all workmen bound by the award, notice to terminate the said award can be given not by an individual workman but by a group of workmen acting collectively either through their union or other- wise, and it is not necessary that such a group of workmen acting coJlectively either through their union or otherwise, should repre- sent the majority of workmen bound by the award. Thus it is open to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate r960 March 3 158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960] I960 the award by which they, along with other employees, are bound just as much as it is open to them to raise an industrial dispute Associated under the Act. Cement Companies The Central Provinces Transport Services Limited v. Raghunath Ltd. Gopal Patwardhan, [1956] S.C.R. 956 and The Newspapers Limited , v. v. The State Industrial Tribunal, U. P., [1957] S.C.R. 754, refer- Their Workmen red to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 404 of 1958. Appeal by special leave from the decision dated March 10, 1958, of the Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot, in Adjudication Case No. 67 of 1955. M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. J. Kolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants. Janardan Sharmii, for respondent No. 2. 1960. March, 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar ]. GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-Can a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen governed by an award give notice to the other party intimating its intention to terminate the award under s. 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 194 7 (herein- after called the Act)? That is the short question which arises for decision in the present appeal. In answering the said question it would be necessary to examine the scheme of the Act and to ascertain the · true meaning and effect of s. 19(6) on its fair and reasonable construction. The controversy thus raised undoubtedly lies within a narrow compass; but before addressing ourselves to the merits of tbe dispute, it is necessary to state the material facts which led to the present proceedings. The present appeitl has been brought before th
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