THE AJMER CENTRAL COOPERATIVE BANK LTD. AJMER, THROUGH THE MANAGING DIRECTOR versus THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY UNDER THE RAJASTHAN SHOPS AND CO. ESTABLISHMENT ACT, AIMER AND ORS.

Citation: [1996] 1 S.C.R. 160 · Decided: 05-01-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.M. AHMADI · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
THE AJMER CENTRAL COOPERATIVE BANK LTD. AJMER, THROUGH 
THE~AGING DIRECTOR 
B 
c 
v. 
THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY UNDER THE RAJASTHAN SHOPS AND 
CO. ESTABLISHMENT ACT, AIMER AND ORS. 
JANUARY 5, 1996 
Rajasthan Shops and Establishment Act, 1958 : Section 28-
A-Prescribed authority-Orders passed by-Validity of 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Section 11-Res Judicata-Applicability 
Appeal--Raising offresh plea-Permissibility o.f. 
D 
Co-operative society-Manager-Allegation of embezzlement-
Enquiry-Disn1issal-Service of Dismissal order-Finding that order was not 
served but communicated only when employee himself requested-Suit by 
employee restraining employer .fro1n imposing punishment--Rejecaon o.f in-
terim injunction in suit by trial as well as appellate court-Application by 
E 
employee under Section 28-A lvas not tilne barred--Reinstate1nent order with 
consequential benefits-Appeal-Held order of authority was not barred by 
Res Judicata--Held e1nployee having elected to move civil court was not 
debarred from n1oving Authorities under Section 28-A. 
The second respondent-Manager of a village level Samiti was dis-
F 
missed from service on the basis of an enquiry held against him i.n which 
he was found guilty of embezzlement and misuse of funds of Society. He 
contended that he was not served with the dismissal order and filed a suit 
seeking injunction against the appellant-Bank from imposing any kind of 
punishment. In this suit, which was withdrawn later, an application filed by 
the second respondent under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil 
G Procedure, 1908 was dismissed by the Civil Court as well as by the first 
appellate C?urt. Having failed to obtain interim injunction during the 
pendency of the suit, the second re.spondent filed a complaint before the 
competent authority under section 28-A of the Rajasthan shops and Estab-
lishment Act, 1958. By its order dated 14.8.1986 the Authority held that 
H 
the termination order dated 1.7.1983 was communicated to the second 
160 
' 
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CO-OPERATIVE BANK v. RAJASTHAN SHOPS & CO., ESTABLISHMENT, ACT, AJMER161 
respondent only on 2.1.1985 when he himself had requested for its service 
on him. Therefore, the application filed under section 28-A was not time 
barred. Further by its order dated 18.6.1987 the authority reinstated the 
second respondent with all consequential benefits holding that the termi-
nation order was bad because (i) the charge of embezzlement had not been 
proved; (ii) the Enquiry Officer and the Management had proceeded with 
a biased attitude. 
The appellant unsuccessfully challenged both the orders before the 
High Court which (i) refused to interfere with the first order on the ground 
A 
B 
that it involved a question of fact and (ii) upheld the second order by 
rejecting the appellants' contention that as the second respondent had a 
C 
right of appeal against the order of dismissal his complaint under section 
28-A was not maintainable. 
In appeal to this court it was contended for the appellant that (i) the 
impugned orders of the authority, both on the question of limitation and 
on merit, were barred by the principles of res judicata; (ii) having elected 
to move the Civil Court the second respondent was debarred from moving 
the Authority under section 28-A; (iii) the impugned order is against the 
settled scope of jurisdiction of the administrative Tribunal to interfere with 
punishment imposed on the delinquent employee. 
Dissmissing the appeal, this Court 
HELD: 1. There is no point on the basis of which the appellant can seek 
upsetting of the impugned order of the High Court and that of the Authority 
under the Rajasthan Shops and Establishment Act, 1958. [169-B] 
2. The observations and the decisions made by the civil Court, 
original as well as appellate, which might have been favourable to the 
appellant, in the nature of their jurisdiction, were never final and were 
meant to merge back or subsume in the final result of the suit. It cannot 
be said that the matters therein were 'directly and substantially" in issue, 
which debarred the Authority to determine the controversy between the 
parties on merit. Additionally the stand taken in the written statement, 
before the Authority was to claim the stay of the proceedings on the 
premise that in order of time, the suit stood filed earlier. Specifically 
section 10 of the Civil procedure Code was invoked to make such claim. 
D 
E 
F 
G 
No bar of res judicata was ple

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