LexTHANU RAM versus STATE OF M.P.
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A [2010] 12 S.C.R. 710 THANU RAM v. STATE OF M.P. (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 5885 of 2009) OCTOBER 05, 2010 [ALTAMAS KABIR AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 498A, 306 and 107 - Married woman committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene upon C herself and setting herself on fire - Suicide committed by victim in her 4th year of marriage when she was six months' pregnant - Victim made dying declarq.tion before Naib Tahsildar (PW9) in presence of Doctor, PW11, who testified that the victim was in a fit mental condition to make the dying O declaration befom PW9 - Evidence of the victim's parents (PWs2 and 3) and brothers (PWs7 and 13) - Conviction of victim's husband under ss. 498A and 306 - Justification of - Held: On facts, justified - Ordinarily, a woman in an advanced stage of pregnancy would not commit suicide even when E treated with cruelty - It is only in extreme circumstances that a woman may decide to take her life and that of her unborn child when she reaches a point of no return - Dying declaration stated in clear and simple language that the victim had been treated with both mental and physical cruelty - F Element of instigation within the meaning of s.107 /PC duly satisfied in view of s. 113A of the Evidence Act - Evidence of P. Ws. 2, 3, 7, 9, 11 and 13 sufficient to establish the prosecution case against the accused-husband - Evidence Act, 1872 - s.113A. G H Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 32 - Dying declaration - Appreciation of. Words and Phrases - "cruelty" - Meaning of - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 498A and 306. 710 THANU RAM v. STATE OF M.P. 711 The petitioner's wife committed suicide in her A matrimonial home by sprinkling kerosene upon herself and setting herself on fire. She died in the hospital having suffered 90-95% burn injuries. Prior to her death, she made a dying declaration to the Naib Tahsildar (PW9). The Doctor, in whose presence the declaration was made, B was examined as P.W.11 to testify that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration before P.W.9. While PW2 and PW3 were the father and mother of the deceased; PWs 7 and 13 were the deceased's brothers. c According to the prosecution, since the deceased committed suicide within 7 years of her marriage with the Petitioner, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, was available against the accused and having regard to the evidence adduced by D the prosecution, a case had clearly been made out for conviction of all the accused persons under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC. The petitioner, his father and mother were tried and E convicted of the offences punishable under Section 498- A and 306 of IPC. The High Court acquitted the Petitioner's father, while confirming the conviction of the Petitioner and his mother. The Petitioner's mother died subsequently. F In the instant Special Leave petition, the petitioner contended that the trial court as well as the High Court had failed to notice the main ingredient of an offence under Section 306 IPC, namely, the question of abetment in the commission of such suicide which has been spelt G out in Section 107 IPC; that the meaning of the expression "cruelty" used in Section 498-A IPC cannot be linked up with an offence under Section 306 IPC, unless the "intention" as mentioned in Section 107 IPC or the H 712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R. A presumption available under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, were duly satisfied and that on facts, there was no evidence on record to indicate that the petitioner had, in any way, instigated his wife with the intention of making her commit suicide and, accordingly, the charge B under Section 306 IPC not be sustained. The could petitioner urged that in the absence of any intention to instigate his wife into committing suicide by his actions, which may at best amount to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC, the provisions of Section 107 IPC c and Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act were not attracted to the facts of the case. Two basic issues therefore arose for consideration, namely, (i) whether the offences complained of under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC were at all sustainable, and D (ii) whether the dying declaration, said to have been made by the Petitioner's wife on which the decision of the Courts below was based, could have been relied upon without proper corroboration. E Di
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