LexTHAKUR RAGHUBIR SINGH AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF AJMER (NOW RAJASTHAN) AND OTHERS
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Alan:gir &· AnoJhcr v. The State of /Jiht1r Gajendragadluir N ove111ber I 4. 478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS_ (1959] Supp. him. The record shows that appelfant No. 2 is the brother of appellant No. I; and, if knowing that ltahmatia had married his brother, appellant No. 2 told the complainant to walk away, that cannot legally justify the inference that he m11st have offered any inducement, blandishment or allurement to Rahmatia 1 for leaving the protection of her husband and refusing · ·to return to him. Indeed the courts below have not considered the case of this appellant separately on its own merits at all. In our opinion, the conviction of appellant No. 2 is not supported by any evidence on the record. The result is the appeal preferred by appellant No. 2 is allowed, the order of conviction and sentence passed against him is set aside and he is ordered to be acquitted and discharged. Appeal of appellant No. 1 d·ismissed. Appeal of appellant No. 2 allowed. THAKUR RAGHUBIR SINGH AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF AJ"fER (NOW ltA.JASTHAN) AND OTHERS (and connected petitions) (S. R. DAS, c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, ll. P. SINHA, K. SuBBA RAO and K. N. \VANCHOO, JJ.) Land Reform-Abolition of Intermediaries-Validity of Enact- mrnt-Competcncy of Legislature-Liability to rernmptir"' of jagir esfates-Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and La11d J«forms Act, 1955 (Ajmer III of z955), ss. 8, 38-Cot1slil11tiot1 of India, Scvrnth Schedule, List I, entry 33, List JI, miry 36, List III, e11lry 42. Section 4 of the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act, 1955, provided for vesting of all estates held by intermediaries, as defined in the Act, in the State from a <late to be notified, and the petitioners who were affected th ere by filed petition~ under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India chal- lenging the Yalidity of the Act and, in particular, ss. 8 and 38 of the Act on the grounds that (r) entry 36 of List II of the (1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 479 Seventh Schedule to the Constitution gave power to the State legislature to acquire property for purposes other than the pur- poses of the Union, while the property acquired under the Act vested in the President and therefore the Union after its acquisi- tion, and the Act was really for the acquisition of property for the purposes of the Union and could not have been passed by the Ajmer legislature, (2) s. 8 provided for retrospective cancel- lation of leases granted at a time when the land-owner had a right to dispose of his property as he liked under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and there was no restriction on such right, and (3) s. 38 which fixed a maximum rent was an unreasonable restriction on the right of the land-owner to let his holding. It was also contended for some of the petitioners who were assignees of land revenue as also owners of land that, under the Act, an intermediary included a jagir and that as a jagirdar was merely an assignee of land revenue, only that assignment could be said to have been acquired under the Act. Held, (1) that the purposes for which the estates were acquired were purposes of the State of Ajmer and, consequently, the Act was within the competency of the Ajmer legislature as it fell within entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution,· and it was not necessary .to consider where the property should vest after acquisition in deciding the ambit of the competence of the legislature under the entry ; (2) that the provisions in s. 8 of the Act which gave power to the Collector to cancel leases which were found to have been made in anticipation of legislation for abolition of intermediaries and which were, consequently, a fraud upon the Act, subserve the purposes of the Act and would, therefore, be an integral part of the Act, though ancillary to its main object, and wer~ protect- ed under Art. 31-A(x)(a) of the Constitution ; (3) that the intention of the Act was that the intermediaries who were allotted lands should cultivate them personally and the object of s. 38 was to discourage them from letting the land and becoming a new kind of intermediaries, and, consequently, the section being an ancillary provision necessary for the pur- poses of carrying out the objects of the Act, was protected under Art. 31-A(x)(a) of the Constitution; and (4) that in view of the origin of the title of the holders of these estates who were called jagirdars, a di
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