TEK SINGH versus SHASHI VERMA AND ANR.

Citation: [2019] 3 S.C.R. 697 · Decided: 04-02-2019 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.F. NARIMAN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
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Judgment (excerpt)

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697
TEK SINGH
v.
SHASHI VERMA AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 1416 of 2019)
FEBRUARY 04, 2019
 [R. F. NARIMAN AND VINEET SARAN, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
s. 115 proviso (As inserted by amendment in 1999) – Revisional
jurisdiction of High Court – Scope of – Held: In view of the proviso
revisional jurisdiction is not maintainable against interlocutory
orders – Scope of jurisdiction u/s. 115 is limited to rectify
jurisdictional errors only.
Or. XXXIX, r. 1 – Interlocutory mandatory injunction – Grant
of – Criteria – Held: When mandatory injunction is granted at interim
stage, much more than a prima facie case has to be made out.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The High Court set aside the concurrent findings
of fact and allowed a revision petition, without dealing with any of
the aspects set out by the first Appellate Court.  The 1999
amendment to the CPC added a proviso Section 115 CPC. A
reading of this proviso will show that, after 1999, revision petitions
filed under Section 115 CPC are not maintainable against
interlocutory orders. Even otherwise, the revisional jurisdiction
under Section 115 CPC is to be exercised to correct jurisdictional
errors only. [Paras 5, 6 and 7][700-B, C, H]
D.L.F. Housing & Construction Company Private Ltd.,
New Delhi v. Sarup Singh and Others [1970] 2 SCR
368; Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden
and Others (1990) 2 SCC 117 : [1990] 1 SCR 332  –
relied on.
2. When a mandatory injunction is granted at the interim
stage, much more than a mere prima facie case has to be made
out. [Para 8][702-F]
[2019] 3 S.C.R. 697
697
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 3 S.C.R.
Case Law Reference
[1970] 2 SCR 368
relied on
Para 7
[1990] 1 SCR 332
relied on
Para 8
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1416
of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.04.2018 of the High Court
of  Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in CMPMO No. 154 of 2017.
E. C. Agrawala, Rajesh Kumar, Ms. Prashi Tyagi, Advs. for the
Appellant.
B. S. Banthia, Adv. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. F. NARIMAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The Respondent No.1 filed a Civil Suit dated 05.03.2013 before
the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Solan under Section 6 of the Specific
Relief Act in which the following reliefs were claimed:
“(a) Declaring that the effect the plaintiff was running business in
Shop No. 3 in the name and style M/s Om Garments owned by
proforma Defendant No. 2 in Anand Complex, The Mall Solan
w.e.f. 28.01.2013 on the basis of partnership deed of the said
date with proforma Defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff has been
wrongly dispossessed by the Defendant No. 1 from the Shop No.
3 in the intervening night of 03.03.2013 – 04.03.2013 illegally,
wrongfully, without the consent of the plaintiff or proforma
Defendant No. 2.
(b) Decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the
Defendant No. 1 from causing any interference on any portion of
suit premises/Shop No. 3 mentioned above.”
3. A written statement was filed by the appellant herein denying
the averments made in the Suit and stating that he has been in possession
since 2004 as a tenant of the landlady, who is Respondent No.2 before
us.
4. The landlady also filed a written statement dated 05.07.2013 in
which she stated that apart from the partnership entered into with
Respondent No.1, the petitioner was her tenant w.e.f. 2004.  An Order
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39 Rule 1 application was filed which was dismissed by the learned
Single Judge on 21.04.2015 saying that the relief asked for could not be
granted at this stage as it would amount to decreeing the Suit itself.  An
appeal filed before the Additional District Judge met with the same fate.
By the judgment dated 19.12.2016, the appellate Court held:
“However, when it is an admitted case of Defendant No. 2
admittedly land lady of the suit shop that she has rented the suit
shop to Defendant No. 1/Respondent and has set up counter
defence that in fact Defendant No. 1 has sublet the suit shop to
the plaintiff which is not at all the case of the plaintiff primafacie
it is clear on record that suit shop was rented by Defendant No. 2
to respondent/defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 1 has been
running suit shop since 17.09.2004 when both the Defendants
have also reduced rent agreement into writing, copy of which is
also available in the case file.  As per rent agreement, the tenancy
had commenced w.e.f. 01.09.2004.  Nothing has come on record,
if Defen
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