TEJKUMAR BALAKRISHNA RUIA versus A.K. MENON AND ANOTHER
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TEJKUMAR BALAKRISHNA RUIA A v. A.K. MENON AND ANOTHER SEPTEMBER 9, 1996 [S.P. BHARUCHA AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.] B Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act 1992-Section 3(3)-''Property" of notified person to be attached "on and from the date of the notification''-Meaningof-Held, does not i11clude income ge11erated by notified person by his ow11 labour after date of notification-17ie C provision does not lead to the co11clusio11 that what is attached is also all such property that he might acquire at a11y time after the date of the notifica- tion-However, /11come or usufntct of attached property is, also attached property. I11terpretatio11 of Statute~rposive interpretation-Courts must inter- D pret the law as. it reads-Where two i11terpretatio11s are possible, the purposive interpretation must be such as preserves constitutionality of the provision-Special Court (Trial of Off enc es Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act 1992-Sectimi 3(3 ). The appellant became a notified person under Section 3(2) of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act 1992 in July 1992. Under Section 3(3), on and from the date of the notification, any property belonging to any notified person shall stand attached simultaneously with the issue of the notification. In 1994, the appellant, appointed as advisor to a company, became entitled to a month- E F ly consultancy fee. When the appellant applied to open an account with a bank, he was informed that the matter had been referred to the Custodian appointed under the Act. The appellant filed a petition in the Special Court seeking a declaration that the income so earned was not liable to attachΒ· ment, and that he be permitted to open and operate a bank account in the G normal course. The Special Court, while acknowledging that the appellant was genuinely seeking release of income which he was earning for his services, dismissed his petition. Suggesting that this could be one way one siphoning off monies which stood unrecovered in proceedings under the Act, it held H 623 624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 5 S:C.R. A that Section 3(3) meant that all assets which became available from and after the date of the notification became attached, and that the term "property'' included present and future property. It gave him liberty to file for a subsistence allowance, which the appellant declined to avail, and preferred the present appeal. B Allowing the appeal, this Court I. Held : 1. Section 3 (3) of the Act is clear that the property that belongs to a notified person stands attached simultaneously with the issue of the notification that makes him a notified party. Neither the words "on and from the date of the notification" nor the word "property'' lead to the C conclusion that what is attached is not only that property which the notified person owned or was possessed of on the date of the notification but also all such property as he might acquire at any time thereafter. [627-C-E] 2. However, the income or usufruct of attached property is also D attached property. It is only income generated by a notified person by dint of his own labour which falls outside the net of Section 3(3). [628-C] 3. If what a notified person obtains by way of purported income or gift or inheritance is really his own money, such money would, upon establishment of the fact, stand attached automatically under the E provisions of Section 3(3). In any event, it is for Parliament to enact a law that meets all contingencies. The courts must interpret the law as it reads. While a purposive interpretation is permissible where two interpretations are possible, the purposive interpretation must be such as preserves the constitutionality of the provision. [ 628-B] F 4. The income which the appellant is earning from his services is not subject to attachment under Section 3(3) and he is entitled to open a bank account for, the purpose of depositing such income alone. [628-E] ClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7143-44 G of 1996. From the Judgment and Order dated 14/21.2.96 of the Special Court, Bombay in Misc.P. No. 278 of 1995. S.D. farekh, N.H. Seervai, S.V. Mehta, B.V. Desai and P J. Mehta H for the Appellant. β’. T.B.RU!Av. AK.MENON [BHARUCHA,J.] 625 A. Subba Rao for the Respondents. A The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHARUCHA, J. These are appeals a
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