TEDHI SINGH versus NARAYAN DASS MAHANT
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A B C D E F G H 442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R. [2022] 4 S.C.R. 442 442 TEDHI SINGH v. NARAYAN DASS MAHANT (Criminal Appeal No. 362 of 2022) MARCH 07, 2022 [K. M. JOSEPH AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.] Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881: s.139 β Presumption in favour of holder β Respondent filed complaint stating that appellant was his friend and as he was in urgent need of money, he gave a sum of Rs.7 lakhs β However, cheque given by the appellant was dishonored β Conviction of appellant u/s.138 β Held: s.139 of the N.I. Act provides that Court shall presume that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in s.138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability β However, it is open to the accused to establish that there is no consideration received β It is in the context of this provision that the theory of βprobable defenceβ has grown β The accused is not expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof β All that the accused needs to establish is a probable defence which is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case β U/s.138, the complainant need not show in the first instance that he had the financial capacity β At the time, when the complainant gives his evidence, unless a case is set up in the reply notice to the statutory notice sent that the complainant did not have the wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the complainant to initially lead evidence to show that he had the financial capacity β However, the accused has a right to demonstrate that the complainant in a particular case did not have the capacity which can be done by producing independent materials, namely, by examining his witnesses and producing documents β It can also be established by pointing to the materials produced by the complainant himself and cross examination of the witnesses of the complainant β In this case, in reply notice appellant did not set up that the complainant did not have the financial capacity to advance the loan β Moreover, no reference was made by the appellant of the complaint of lost cheque book or signed cheque leaf β No evidence was led to establish that the appellant had informed the Bank about the loss of cheque book A B C D E F G H 443 containing blank cheque β In totality of facts, appellant has not been able to establish a case of interference with the finding of courts below that the offence under s.138 was committed by the appellant β Thus, conviction u/s.138 N.I Act upheld β However, sentence of one year imprisonment substituted with fine. Constitution of India: Art.136 β Power of Supreme Court to interfere β Art.136 of the Constitution only confers a right to obtain special leave in rare and extraordinary cases β While exercising power under Art.136, the Court may not refuse to interfere in a case where three Courts have gone completely wrong β It is not to be understood as meaning that it is a clear case of even three Courts in unison falling into palpable error and thereby causing miscarriage of justice and yet this Court would not interfere. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. It is true that this is a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 139 of the N.I. Act provides that Court shall presume that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. This presumption, however, is expressly made subject to the position being proved to the contrary. In other words, it is open to the accused to establish that there is no consideration received. It is in the context of this provision that the theory of βprobable defenceβ has grown. In an earlier judgment, in fact, which has also been adverted to in Basalingappa, this Court notes that Section 139 of the N.I. Act is an example of reverse onus. It is also true that this Court has found that the accused is not expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof. It is accordingly that the principle has developed that all which the accused needs to establish is a probable defence. As to whether a probable defence has been established is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case on the conspectus of evidence and circumstances that exist. [Para 7][449-D-G] 2. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have noted that in the case under Section 138 of the N. I. Act, the complainant need not show in the first instance that he had the capacity. The proceedin
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