LexTATA ENGINEERING & LOCOMOTIVE COMPANY LTD. versus GRAM PANCHAYAT PIMPRI WAGHERE
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306 A TATA ENGINEERING & LOCOMOTIVE COMPANY LTD. :o iF H v. GRAM PAN CHA YAT PIMPRI WA GHERE August 23, 1976 [A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.] Bombay Village Panchayat Act (Bom. 6 of 1933), s. 89-'House' if includes 'building'. Interpretation of statutes-Ru/es as an aid-Use of Statement of objects \ and reasons. \_ The respondent is a village Panchayat constituted under the Bornb~y Village Panchayat Act, 1933. The Act initially empowered the Panchayat to levy tax on houses and lands as one of the ta·xes enumerated in s. 89 (2). In 1939, the section ·was amended and s. 89 (1) made it obligatory pn Panchayats to levy tax on houses and iands. The amending Act of 1947 provided that eve1y panchayat sha·ll levy a tax upon the owners or occupiers or 'houses including farm buildings and conferred power on the Panchayat to tax ihOps nnd hotels. The 1952-Amendment conferred power to tax premises where machinery is run by steam etc. In exercise of the powers under s. 89 the respondent, by a. resolution of 1952, imposed tax on houses within its jurisdiction. In 1954, s. 89 was amended and the word 'buildings' was substituted for the words 'houses' :rnd 'houses including farm buildings'. By a resolution of 1964, the respondent revised the tax on houses and also stated that for factories the tax would be at a concessional rate. The respondent demanded taxes on the appelJ;,nt's factory buildings for the years 1967 to 1970. The appellant challenged the levy un- successfully in the High Court. In appeal to this Court it was conteuded that : ( l) since it was only in 1954 that the word 'building' was substituted for the word 'house', the respon- dent had no power to impose taxes on the fa·ztory buildings by the 1952 resolution; and (2) even if the 1952-resolution authorised the levy. since it was replaced by the 1964-resolution, which was not valid as it was not passed in accordance with the Act and the rules, no tax could be levied either under the 1952-resolution or under the 1964-resolution. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : ( 1) The word 'house' would in its ordinary sense include any 'building' irrespective of its user. Having regard to the nature of the word as used in taxing and municipal legislation, and the nature and purpose of the statute in the present case, it is manifest that the legislature used the word 'house' so that the Panchayat would be in a position to levy taxes on all buildings situated in the village. [319A] (a) The word 'house' is not defined in the Act. Therefore, the word must be construed in that sense which people, conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it. To ascertain ·its meaning one must understand the subject-matter with respect to which it is used in a statute. The weight of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the word 'house' is not restricted to a mere dwelling house, but also extends to a 'building which is med for business'. [316 E-F, 317DJ Yorkshire Insurance v. Clayton 8 Q.B.D. 424. Grant v. Langston 1900 A.C. 383, Daniel v. Coulsting 14 L.I.C. P 70, Folkes/one v. Woodward L.R. 15 Eq. 159, Wimbledon Urban District Coun::il v. Hastings 87 L.T.R. 118, Raven- seft Properties v. London Borough of Hl/lmgdon 1969 20 P & C.R. 483 and Corpus Juris Secund11m Vol. 41 pages 364 and 365 referred to. (b) The rules. framed under the Act and p1aced before the legislatnre for approval, are a legit!mate aid in the c?n;itru.ctton of the st~tute .as Con/em: poranea Expositio. (1) they made no d1st111cbon between dwelhng houses I ;. I f TATA ENGINEERING V. GRAM PANCHAYAT 307 and 'buildings', (ii) the 1934-rules used the word 'lands .and buildings' instead A of the words 'lands and houses'; and (iii) the 1943-rules defined 'house' as any 'building or set of buildings within the same enclosure'. (317}<] (c) The Act, in 1933, empowered a Panchayat to levy tax not only on houses but also on lands. It would be unsound to hold that a land which is admittedly taxable would be exempt when a factory is built upon it. (317 HJ (d) In the Amending Act of 1945 the expressions 'farm buildings' and 'houses' are used without distinction. (317 G] B, (e) The 1947-Amendment indicates that the tax was on the business of shops and hotels. and not on the houses where such business is run, and the 1952-Amendment introduces one more optional tax in s. 89(2) as different
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