TARACHAND DAMU SUTAR versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation: [1962] 2 S.C.R. 775 · Decided: 04-05-1961 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.L. KAPUR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

2 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
775 
TARACHAND DAMU SUTAH 
v. 
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
(,T.L. KAPUR, K. SunHA RAo, M. HrnAYA'l'ULLAH, 
J. C. SHAH and RAGHUllAR DAYAL, JJ.) 
Appcal-O':a_rye uf murder---;Convictlon bY &•Iii°''." Juu,ye 
for culpable homicide not amuunl•ny to murder-lbgh Cuu1t. °'' 
appeal cunvicting for n!'llrdcr and pa&siny sc1tte-ncc of deatlt-li<?ht 
uf appeal-Acquittal, Aicaning of-Practice in appeat-Cunst1tu· 
lion of India Art. 134 (1) (a). 
The appe!lant was tried for an offence under s. 302 
Indian Penal Code for the murder of his wife. The evidence 
consisted mainly of the uncorroborated dying .declaration of 
the wife. The Scssious Judge accepted the evidence but 
convicted the aopellant under s. 304 Part I Indian Penal Code. 
On appeal by the State the High Court convicted the appellant 
of an offence under s. 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced him 
to death. The appe!lant contended that he had a right of appeal 
to the Supreme Couri under Art. 
134 (I) (a) of the Consti-
tution and that his conviction was bad. 
Held, that the appel!aut had a right ofappeal"to the 
Supreme Court under An. 134 (1) (a) of the Constitution. 
The conviction of the appellant under s. 304 Part I of the 
Indian 
Penal 
Code by 
the Sessions 
Judge amounted 
to an acquittal of the offence under s. 302 and the High 
Court had reversed this order of acquittal and sentenced the-
appellant to death. The word "acquittal" in Art. 
13+ (1) (a) 
did not mean that the trial must have ended in a complete 
acquittal of the charge, but acquittal of the offence charged 
and conviction for a n1inor offence was included in the word 
"acquittal". 
Kishan Singh v. 'l'he King Emperor, (1928) L. R. 55, 
I.A. 390 relied on. 
Per Kapur, Subba Rao and Shah, JJ. The appellant 
was rightly convicted and sentenced by the High Court. It 
was legal to found a conviction on the uncorroborated dying 
declaration. The dying declaration had been accepted both by 
the Sessions Judge and by the High Court and there was 
nothing in the evidence on the record which detracted from 
the findings of those courts in regard to the correctness or the 
propriety of this dying declaration. 
1961 
May, 4. 
1961 
Tarac1iantl 
Damu Sutar 
v. 
The State of 
Maharashtra. 
Kapur J. 
776 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1002] 
Kltushal Rao v: The State of Bombay, (1958) S.C.R. 552, 
referred to. 
Per Hidayatullah and Dayal, JJ. Jn an appeal under 
Art. 
134 (I) (a) of the Constitution the Supreme Court 
assessed afresh the evidence on record and did not follow the 
practice in appeals by special Leave under Art. 136 that 
concurrent findings cJf the Courts below could be interfered with 
only when ~peCial circumstances existed. In the circumstances 
of the present case it was not safe to rely on the dying declara. 
tion and the appellant was entitled to be acquitted. 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal 
Appeal No. 341 of 1960. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment 
and order dated July 20, 1900, of the Bombay High 
Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 488, 420 of 1960 
with Review Application Nos. 555 and 641 of 1960. 
G. C. Mathur, for the appellant. 
B.R.L. Iyengar and D. Gupta, for the respon-
dent. 
HJ61. May 4. The Judgment of Kapur, Subba 
Rao and Shah, JJ , was delivered by Kapur, J., and 
the judgment of Hidayatullah and Dayal, JJ., was 
delivered by Dayal, J. 
KAPUR, J. This is an n.ppeal against the 
judgment ~nd order of the High Court of Bombay 
imposing the sentence of death in appeal by the 
State against the order passed by the Sessions 
Judge, Dhulia. The facts of the appeal are these: 
The appellant, 
in about 
1950, married 
Sindhubai the 
daughter 
of Chandrabhagabai. 
Sindhubai who is the deceased had read up to the 
7th. Standard. The appellant and Sindhubai were 
residing in a one room tenement in a house belong-
ing to one Tavar pleader in which there are in all 
12 to 15 tenements. The tenement of the appellant 
was not very far from that of the appellant's 
cousin Shantabai who was residing with her 
husband Pandu Geuda 
and 
the 
house 
of 
2 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
777 
Chandrabha<rabai was about a furlong away from 
that of the ;ppcllant. The relations between the 
appellant and the tfoccased were normal for some.-
time but about two years before the occurrence 
differences had arisen and there were frequent 
quarrels between them. A ehild of the marriage 
was born about 1-1/2 years before the occurrence. 
The deceased was a fre

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