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TARA CHAND versus SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY.

Citation: [1971] 2 S.C.R. 908 · Decided: 03-12-1970 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.M. SIKRI · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

908 
TARA CHAND 
v. 
SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY. 
December 3, 1970 
(S. M .. SIKRI, V. BHARGAVA AND I. D. DUA, JJ.] 
Dtftne< of India Rules 1962 rr. 126J and 126X-Notificatnons under-
.if .enable Collector or Assistant Collector to delegate authority to institute 
prostcution for offence urtder r. 126-P(2)-Seni:ence-Jf minimum sentence 
to be gaverned by provisions of Rules or b.v Act 18 of 1965 when Act in 
Fore~. 
The Appellant was searched on alighting from a plane at the H.A.L. 
Aerodrome, Bangalore, on November 16, 1963 and a quantity of Gold 
was found on and seized from him. 
After obtaining sanction from the 
Collector under section 137(1) of the Customs Act anp under Rule 126-Q 
of Defence of India Rules, 1962, the Superintendent of Central Excise 
filed a complaint against the Appellant. The Trial Court did not find any 
evidence establishing that the Gold had been smuggled and the Appellant 
was therefore acquitted of the offence under section 135 of the Customs 
Act. 
As regards the case against the Appellant under Rule 126-P(2), the 
Trial Court held that according to the Notification issued by the Govern· 
ment of India on November 5, 1963 in modification of the Notification 
dated January 10, 1963 issued under Rule 126-J read with Rule 126-X, 
either the Assistant Collector of Centra!•Excise or the Collector of Central 
Excise could ,institute the ·prosecution; these officers were not authorised 
to delegate powers to institute prosecution. The Court, therefore, acquitted 
the Appellant on the view that the complaint was not filed by an Officer 
competontly authorised. 
The High Court in appeal disagreed with this 
view holding that the CoJlector was lawfully empowered to authorise the 
Superintendent of Central Excise to prosecute the a;ipellant. The Court 
convicted the appellant and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment fct 
six months. 
Dismissing an appeal to this Court, 
HELD : The plain reading of the relevant entries in the Notification 
of January 10, !963 as amended by the ·Notification of November 5, 
1963 dearly shows that it authorises the Collecter to exercile the power 
and function in relation to -the institution of prosecution for any offence 
punishal>le under Part XII-A of the Rules referred ·lo in r. 126Q. Keep-
ing in view the multifarious activities of the higher officers of the Central 
Excise Department it seems clear that ·after the responsible officen of this 
Department not inferior in rank )o the Assistant Collector had applied 
their m1, d and come to a decisron as to the desirability of starting the 
prosecution in a given case, further steps in the matter of actual prosecu-
tion including the drafting and presentation of the. complaint could be 
lawfully carried out by others. To hOld otherwise would not only mean un-
duly straining .the unambiguous statutolry language but would also tend to 
thwart, instead of effectuating, their real purpose. [915 C-FJ 
The're was no force in the contention that the charge levelled against 
the appellant was vague or in any way different from the one for which 
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TARA CHAND \'. SUPDT. CENTRAL EXCISE (Dua. ],) 
909 
he was convicted. 
In fact the appellant had admitted all the relevant 
·facts alleged by the prosecution. 
The facts alleged and proved clearly 
brought the appellant's case within the mischief of rule 126H(2) (d) and 
126-P(2). 
Although under the new Gold (Control) "Act 18 of 1965. 
which had repealed Part XII-A of the Rules, there is no minimum sen-
tence of imprisonment prescribed, the present case must be governed by 
the law in force at the time and therefore the minimum sentence of 6 
:nonths under rule 126-P(2) (ii) must apply. [916 D, G] 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
76 of 1968. · 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 
February 8, 19618 of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Appeal 
No. 215 of 1966. 
V. M. Tarkunde, R. Jethamala11i, N .. H. Hi11gora11i and K. 
Hi11gorani, for the appellant. 
S. P. Nayar, for the respondent. 
The Juogment of the Court was delivered by 
Dua, J. 
This appeal by special . leav~ is directed against 
the judgment and order of the Mysore High Court· on appeal 
setting aside in part the order of the appellant's acquittal by 
a Second Class Magistrate and convicting him under r. 126P (2) 
of the Defence of India Rules as amended in 1963-hereafter 
called the Rules-and sentencing him to ri

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