LexTAPINDER SINGH versus STATE OF PUNJAB
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A ll c D E F G H 599 TAPINDER SIN6h l'. STATE OF PUNJAB May 7, 1970 [A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.] Code of Cri111i11a/ Procedure, 1898 .\". 154-F.irJ'I lnfonnation Report, 1rlu1t is-S. 162( I) of Cude 1vht•ther bars adn1ission a/ dying declartltivn i11to evidence. Ei·idence Act. 1872-Dying declaration is ad111issible under s. 32(1.) t111d har of s. 16:2( I) c·r. P. C. does not app/y--Value of dying declara- tion. Ballistic expert-If eye-·witnesse.\· are believed the non.exan1ina1ion of h"llistic expert lost'.\' all i111portance. The appellant \\'as tried for Jl1Urder on the allegation that he caused the death of B by firing five shots at him from his pistol. The te;timony against him consisted of a dying de;::laration made by B, the statements of three eyewitnesses and some circumstantial evidence. The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. The conviction and sentence "W',,!rc affirmed by the High Court. ln appeal by special Jea>e before this Court the appellant con:ended : (i) that the information relating to the occurrence given to the p91icc by telephone regarding \\ hich an entry v.·as made in the daily dairy must be treated as the first information report: (ii) that the. dying declaration of deceased was in- a<lmissible because it was hit by s. 162 of the code of Criminal Pro- ce<lure; (iii) that the dying declaration was unreliable; (iv) that the evid- ence in the case was not sufficient to iustify the conviction of the appellant; ( ,. ) that, amon_g other omissions, the non-examination of the ballistic ex- pert created a lacuna in the prosecution case; and (vi) that in view of the alle.e:ed motive-the appellant's suspicion that the de:eased ha<l illicit re- lations with his ,i,.·ifc-the sentence should be reduced. H) LD : ( i) The telephonic message recorded in the daily diary of the police station IA-·as a cryptic and anonymous oral message which did not in terms clearly specify a cognizable offence and could not, therefore, be treated as first information report. The mere fact that this information ,\'as the first in point of time could not by itself clothe it v.·ith the character of first information report. The question whether or not a parti- cular document constitutes a first information report, has to be deter- n1ine<l on the relevant facts and circumstances of each case. f605 B-Cl Iii) Section 162 Criminal Proced.urc Code in expres'i terms excludes fron1 its purvicv.: statements 'falling within the provisions of s. 32( 1) of the Indian Evidence Act. Indisputably, the dying declaration in the present case fell within s. 3 (I) of the Indian Evidence Act and as such it was hoth relevant and outside the prohibition contained in s.161(1) Cr. P. C. 1605 D-El iiii) (a) In view of the evidence of the Judicial Ma.gi:strate -.yho re- corded the dving declaration the mere fact that the ori~mal clymg de- claration had been stolen from the file, could not destroy its value. Nor could the fact that the investigating officer was allowed to make a copy 600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS_ (1971] l S.C.R. I of the dying declaration be interpreted to mean that the Magistrate was subservient to the police. A dying declaration is not a confidential docu- ment and can legitim<:.tely serve as a guide in further investigation. [606 D-G] (b) A dying declaration is not a deposition in court and it is neither made on oath nor in the presence of the accused. It is therefore not tested in cross-examination on behalf of the accused. But a dying de- claration is admitted in evidence by way of an exception to the general rule against the admissibility of hearsay evidence on the principle of necessity. The weak points of the dying declaration merely serve to put the court on its guard while testing its reliability by imposing on it an obligation to closely Scrutinise all attendant circumstances. So scrutinised, the dying declaration in the present case must be accepted as true. [607 D-E] (iv) If the dying declaration is acceptable as true then even 1n the absence of other corroborative evidence it would Oe open to the court to act upon the dying declaration and com·ict the appellant stated therein to be the offender. An accusation in a dyin.Q: c!ectaration comes from the victim and if it is accepted then in view of its sources che ,court can safely act on it. In the present case not on-ly the dying declaration but the oth_er evidence inc
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