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TAHSIL NAIDU & ANR. versus KULLA NAIDU & ORS.

Citation: [1970] 2 S.C.R. 499 · Decided: 18-09-1969 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
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fl 
499 
TAHSIL NAIDU & ANR. 
v. 
KULLA NAIDU & ORS. 
September 18, 1969 
(V. BHARGAVA, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. RAY, JJ.J 
Hindu Law-Adoption ~v wl'doll', with sapindas' consent-Principles 
cpplicable-Nearest sapinda, woman-If her consent necessary to validate 
adoption. 
A Hindu widow in the Dravida country, who had no authority from 
her hc15band to adopt, adopted a son with the consent of two out of three 
)f her nearest male sapindas in 1955. The two sapindas gave their written 
consent in re·sponse to her letters asking for their consent wherein she 
stated that the object of the adoption was the proper pe'rformance of cere-
monies for the benefit of her husband and his ancestors. They also signed 
the adoption deed which mentioned the purpose of the 
adoption. 
The 
widow, however, did not obtain the. consent of her husband's grandmother, 
who was nearer in degree than these two sapindas. 
On the question of the validity of the adoption, 
HELD : (I) The validity of an adoption has to be judged by spiritual 
rather than tempofai considerations. 
But, in a case where the 
widow 
makes an. adoption after obtaining her sapindas' consent, her motive need 
not be inquired into because, the very fact that the sapindas had given 
their consent was a guarantee that the adoption was being made for proper 
reasons. f505 G·HJ 
(2) It is only when a sapinda refuses consent that it becomes relevant 
to see whether the !refusal was justified on the ground that the adoption was 
not for proper objects. Where a sapinda gives consent, the very fact that 
the consent was given implies that the adoption was considered desirable 
and was being resorted to by the widow for spiritual con·siderations. [509 
C-EJ 
In the present case, the consenting sapindas had no personal motives 
in giving the consent, spiritual benefit of her husband was in fact one of 
the considerations for the Widow making the adoption, and the sapindas had 
not merely an implied but express knowledge that the adoption was being 
resorted tO by the widow for spiritual considerations. Though one of them 
was not examined as a witness, his consent letter was proved by a witness 
in who•e p!resence he signed the letter. [508 A-B; 510 A-BJ 
( 3) The consent of the majority o( the nearest sapindas would be su11L 
cient to satisfy the requirement that a widow should consult the nearest 
sapindas. Therefore, the consent given by two out of three equally near 
sapindas, was sufficient to support the adoption. [508 G-HJ 
( 4) The consent of a sapinda for adoption by a widow, who has no 
authority from her husband1 was required under Hindu law, because, a 
woman is considered incapable of exercising independent judgment in the 
matt~r. In the present case if the g\"andmother of the deceased husband 
were to desire to adopt a son, herself would have to obtain the consent 
of her ·sapindas in the absence of her husband's authority, because of her 
incapacity to exercise independent judgment: and it would follow that she 
could hardly be a competent adviser to another widow, namely, her grand· 
500 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1970) 2 S .. C.R. 
son's widow on the same matter. Therefore, even if she happens to be 
the nearest sapinda there could be no requirenlent that her consent must 
be obtained for validating the adoption. [511 E-F; G-H; 512 BJ 
(5) The reference in The Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga 
Sethupatty, 11 M.l.A. 397, to kindred or kinsmen, whose consent is to be 
obtained by a widow for a valid adoption, is to male agnates only. In 
that case, the opinion of the mother-in-law regarding the adoption by her 
daughter-in-daw was considered important by the Judicial Committee only 
because of the. special authority granted to the mother-in-law by her son 
and not because, in every case, the . consent of a mother-in-law was neces· 
sary to make an adoption by the daughter-in-law vali!i, or that her consent 
must be obtained on the ground that she is the nearest Kindred alive. [512 
F; 513 B-C; 514 HJ 
V.T .S. Chandrasekhara Mudaliar v. Kulandai Veli \1udalicr [1963] 
2 S.C.R. 4'10, followed. 
Raghanadha v. Brojo Kishoro, [1876J LR. 3 I.A. 154, Veera Bcsava-
raju v. Balasurya Prasada Rao, [1918J L.R. 45 I.A. 265 and Glil>nta China 
Ramasubba,vya v. Moparthi Chenchuram.ayya,·L.R. 74 I.A. 162, .applied. 
c 
Varadamma v. Kanchi Scnkara Reddi A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 933, approved. 
Observations Contra in Rajah Damara Kumara Venkctappa Nayanim 
D 
Bahadur Varu v.

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