T. V. VATHEESWARAN versus STATE OF TAMIL NADU

Citation: [1983] 2 S.C.R. 348 · Decided: 16-02-1983 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: O. CHINNAPPA REDDY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
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Judgment (excerpt)

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348 
T. V. VATHEESWARAN 
v. 
STATE OF TAMIL NADU 
February 16, 1983 
(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.] 
Constitution of India-Art. 21-Pr/soner sentenced to death-Detention 
awaiting execution-Detention exceeding two years violative of guarantee of fair 
p'rocedure under Art. 21. 
The appellant was sentenced to death in January, 1975 on a charge of 
committing wicked and diabolic murders and ·since then he was in -solitary 
confinement. Before conviction, he had been a 'prisoner under remand' for 
two years. 
The appellant's contention was that to take away his life after keeping him 
in jail for ten years, eight of which in illegal solitary confinement, woukl be 
violative of Art. 21. 
Allowing the appeal and converting the sentence of death to one of 
imprisonment for life, 
HELD : The dehumanising factor of prolonged delay in the execution of 
a sentence of death has the constitutional implication of depriving a person of 
his life ia an unjust, unfair and unreasonable way so as to offend the constitu-
tional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal Hberty 
except according to procedure established by law. Making all 
reasonable 
allowance for the time necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve, a 
delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be 
considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke 
Art. 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death. [359 G-H, 360 D·B] 
(i) A conviiJt is entitled to the precious right guaranteed in Art. 21. The 
right to a speedy trial is implicit in the right to a fair trial which has been held 
to be part of the right to life and liberty guaranteed by this Article. 
[357 D, 3S7 G·H, 358 A] 
Bhuvan Mohan Patnalk v. State of A. P., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 24; Suni/ Batra v. 
Delhi Administration, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 392; State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar 
Pandurang Sangzgiri & Anr., [1966] I S.C.R. 702; State of Maharashtra v. 
Champa/al, A.LR. [1981] S.C. 1675; Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary, 
[1980] 1 S.C.C. 81 and Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary, (1980] I 
$.C.C. 98 referred to. 
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T,V. VATHBBSWARAN V. TAMIL NADU 
349 
(ii) The fiat of Art. 21 is that any procedure which deprives a person of 
his life or liberty must be just,1 fair and ,.reasonable. It implies humane condi-
tions of detention, preventive or punitive. 'Procedure established by law' does 
not end with the pronouncement of sentence; it includes the carrying out of 
sentence. Prolonged detention to await the execution of a sentence of death is 
an unjust, unfair and unreasonable procedure and the only way to undo the 
wrong is to quash the sentence of death. [359 D-E, 359 G-H, 360 A] 
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978] 2 S.C.R. 621, Sunil Batra v. Delhi 
Administration, (1979] 1 S.C.R. 392 and Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, A.i.R. 
[1980] S.C. 898 referred to. 
(iii) Sentence of death is one thing; sentence of death followed by lengthy 
imprisonment prior to execution is another. A period of anguish and suffering 
is an_ inevitable consequence of sentence of death, but a prolongation of it beyond 
the time necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve is not. And, it is 
no answer to say that the man will struggle to· stay alive. In truth, it is this 
ineradicable, human desire which makes prolongation inhuman and degrading 
with its anguish of alternating hope and despair, the agony of uncertainty and 
the consequences of such suffering on the mental, emotional and physical inte--
grity and health of the individual. Where, after the sentence of death is given, 
the accused is made to undergo inhuman and degrading punishment or where 
the execution of ~he sentence is endlessly delayed and the accused is made to 
suffer the most excruciating agony and anguish, it is open to a court of appeal 
or a court exercising writ jurisdiction, in an appropriate proceeding, to take note 
of the circumstance when it is brought to its notice and give relief where 
necessary. [352 E·G, 350 F, 360 E] 
Noel Riley & Ors. v. The Attorney General & Anr., [1982] Cr!. Law R eview 
679; Piaradusadh v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1944 F.C. 1; Ediga Annamma v. State of 
Andhra Pradesh, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 329; State of U.P. v. Lalla Singh, A.I.R. [1978] 
S.C 368; Bhagwan Baux Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. [1978] S.C. 34; Sadhu 
Singh v. StateofU.P., A.LR. [1978] S.C.1506; State of U.P. v. Sahai, A.I.R. 
[198
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