T. SIVASUBRAMANIAM AND ORS. versus KASINATH PUJARI AND ORS.

Citation: [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 143 · Decided: 31-08-1999 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.N. KHARE · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

T. SIVASUBRAMANIAM AND ORS. 
A 
v. 
KA SINA TH PUJARI AND ORS. 
AUGUST 31, 1999 
[V.N. KHARE AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.] 
B 
Rent Control & Eviction 
Tamilnadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960-Sections 
10(3) (a) (i) and 10(3) (e)-Eviction-Bonafide need-Landlord desirous of C 
living separately-Desire arising out of need-Evidence adduced to show 
that need was bonafide-No Desire may be outcome of one's need-Held, 
when landlord desires a premises, he must set out his need for the premises 
in his p~tition and establish that such a need is bonafide-Thus, mere desire 
cannot constitute need ·and a ground for eviction. 
Section 25-Revisional Jurisdiction-High Court-Not to interfere with 
finding of facts merely because it disagrees with the findings of the lower 
court-However, where a finding is based on no evidence, High Court would 
be justified in setting aside such finding recorded by the lower court. 
D 
The appellants filed a petition for eviction of respondents from the E 
premises under Sections 10(2) (ii) (a), 10(2) (vii) & 10(3) (a) (i) of T.N. 
Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 before the Rent Controller. In 
the petition appellant did not set out his need much less bonafide need for 
the premises. There was a bare statement that appellant desired to live 
separately from his father. The Rent Controller allowed the petition and F 
ordered eviction. The respondents went in appeal before the Appellate Court 
and it rejected the appeal. The High Court allowed the respondent's revision 
petition and set aside the order of eviction on the ground that appellant did 
not set out his bonafide need for the premises. 
In appeal to this Court the appellants contended that the element of G 
need for the premises is implicit when a landiord desires to live separately 
from his father and the view taken by the High Court that mere desire to 
live separately is not sufficient to constitute need for the premises, is 
erroneous; and that it is also not permissible for the High Court in exercise 
of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act to interfere with 
I~ 
H 
144 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] Sl,JPP. 2 S.C.R. 
A the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by Lower Courts. 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD : 1.1. A desire takes its origin from what one likes and dislikes 
and necessarily it is not dependent upon one's need. But sometimes the 
B desire may be the outcome of one's need. So when a landlord desires a 
premises, the requirement of Sections 10(3) (a) (i) and 10(3) (e) of T.N. 
Building Act, 1960 is that the landlord must set out his need for the 
premises in his petition and establish that such a need is bonafide. The need 
must be bonafide, genuine, honest and conceived in good faith. [147-G-H] 
C 
Hameeda Hardware Stores v. Mohan Lal Sowcar, (1988] 2 SCC 513; 
Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, (1986] 4 SCC 736 and Ram Dass 
v. Ishwar Chander, [1988] 3 SCC 131, relied on. 
1.2. In the present case, it was not pleaded by the landlord in his 
petition that he for certain compelling reasons desired to live separately 
D from his father and for that reason he required the premises. There was no 
evidence on record to show that the landlord required the premises and his 
need was bonafide. The only material on record for eviction of the tenants 
before the Rent Control Authority was mere desire of the landlord to live 
separately from his father. Such a desire is not a substitute of the need for 
E the premises which a landlord is required to plead-and establish. Thus, the 
landlord's desire to live separately is not a valid ground for eviction of the 
tenants from the premises. (148-A-C] 
_ 2.1.-Section 25 of the Act confers revisional jurisdiction to the High 
Court. The words "to satisfy itself' as to regularity of such proceedings or 
F the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders passed is a 
power of superintendence. The High Court is not required to interfere with 
the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with 
the findings of the courts below. The power exercisable by the High Court 
under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or 
G reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the 
finding recorded by the courts below. Butwhere a finding arrived at by the 
courts below is· based on no evidence, the High court would be justified in 
interfering with such a finding record

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